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 Preface 
Labour market regulation is the subject of much theoretical work as well as of 
extensive measurement and empirical assessment efforts. In recent years, economists have 
paid much attention to this issue, with a strong focus on three major aspects of labour 
regulation: (1) rent-seeking tools which are meant to alter distribution at the expense of 
production efficiency; (2) buffers to limit the impact of self-interested behaviours on social 
interactions, thereby preserving the dignity of workers as well as their collective incentives 
for work; and (3) remedies for market imperfections, notably as regards provision of 
insurance, and of efficient reallocation, retraining and job-seeking activities. 
In this paper, Professor Bertola reviews these three views from both theoretical and 
empirical perspectives, highlighting the fact that full laissez faire can be inappropriate for 
solving problems of allocation and pay in the labour market in the presence of political-
economic tensions, imperfect information and enforcement problems. His review clearly 
points to the critical importance of a “balanced” theoretical framework of labour regulation 
which takes into account how historical, political and economic structural factors shape the 
motivation and effects of labour market policies. He concludes by outlining directions for 
future research, particularly concerning empirical work on the determinants of labour 
market institutions in rapidly changing environments. 
This paper is an input to our new project on Regulating for Decent Work, which aims 
at creating an international research network with a view to advancing research and policy 
directions tailored towards making labour market regulation more effective. The starting 
point of this project is that carefully designed regulations and enforcement mechanisms are 
essential to the goal of improving working life. The project is interdisciplinary and 
involves researchers from a range of fields including economics, law, sociology and 
industrial relations. 
It is hoped that this paper will stimulate a more-balanced debate on labour regulation 
issues, thereby contributing to making regulations more effective. 
 
 
Manuela Tomei, 
Chief, 
Conditions of Work and Employment Programme, 
Social Protection Sector 
iv Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 21 
 Introduction 
Labour market institutions that influence the level, stability and dispersion of 
employment and labour costs would make no sense in an otherwise perfect world where 
markets maximized the welfare of a “representative agent”. In that world, any interference 
with laissez faire outcomes could only be motivated by “rent-seeking” redistribution 
motives, would tend to be circumvented by efficient individual choices and, to the extent 
that it is not completely ineffective, would decrease efficiency. The real world is not 
perfect, however, so labour market regulation does shape market interactions, and 
collective policies can pursue meaningful, if certainly debatable, goals. 
Interference with labour market outcomes does influence the distribution of welfare 
across heterogeneous individuals in ways that, just because markets are neither perfect nor 
complete, cannot be replaced by theoretically more efficient ex ante redistribution. For the 
same reason, collective policy interventions can affect aggregate welfare as well as its 
distribution. Unemployment may be due to collective interference with laissez faire market 
interactions, but these outcomes and institutions are a symptom of underlying problems. 
Wage and employment choices are constrained at the individual level for potentially 
sensible reasons in a world of imperfect labour and financial markets. Higher wages and 
lower employment can be beneficial for individuals who cannot access financial markets 
and therefore have negligible non-labour income. And limitations of individual workers’ 
access to financial instruments can similarly rationalize collectively administered risk-
sharing schemes. 
This paper organizes a review of theories, facts and findings around such insights. Its 
discussion of the institutional configurations of labour markets pays particular attention to 
the joint operation of employment and wage rigidities. Its interpretation of their motivation 
and implications focuses on relationships between the organization of labour markets and 
other structural and economic features, both across countries and in different historical 
circumstances, with particular attention to international aspects of the relevant issues. 
Section 1 reviews theoretical approaches to the motivation and implications of labour 
market regulation. Interference with market outcomes may be based on rent-seeking 
motives, and be meant to alter the distribution of income between labour and other factors 
of production while inefficiently reducing the amount of output produced by available 
resource. Collective constraints on individual choices may, however, buffer the impact on 
social interactions of self-interested economic behaviour, preserving the dignity of workers 
as well as their collective incentives to provide effort, and may remedy market 
imperfections, not only as regards the allocation and pay of labour but also, and arguably 
more importantly, as regards provision of insurance and of efficient incentives to undertake 
human capital investments. 
These views all highlight, from different standpoints, the important and related 
information and enforcement problems encountered by markets in addressing welfare 
issues. Distributional tensions and socio-political considerations, while highly relevant, are 
rooted in underlying market imperfections. If markets were perfect, policies would be 
obviously counterproductive if effective, and would be easily circumvented – hence 
ineffective – by powerful efficiency-enhancing market transactions. In the real world, 
policy can address labour market imperfections, such as difficulties in matching demand 
and supply, and can also foster efficient labour reallocation and consumption smoothing in 
the presence of financial and other market imperfections. 
Imperfections are many in the labour market, as in all markets where highly 
differentiated goods are traded in conditions of imperfect information. While governments 
and other collective bodies may exploit detection and enforcement powers superior to 
Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 21 1 
 those available to private agents and private contracts, they may or may not be better 
informed than market participants regarding the structural features of economic 
interactions, and while information collection can provide a very useful public good, it can 
be very expensive and imprecise in our imperfect world. Thus, policies that affect 
employment and wage patterns need not improve on the laissez faire allocation of labour 
in general. Labour market regulation can also be motivated by financial market 
imperfections, however. A more general guiding principle for welfare-improving policy 
interventions may be focused on fostering suitable forward-looking decisions by workers. 
This entails a degree of labour-income stabilization, while preserving incentives for 
reallocation and retraining, so as to afford smoother consumption patterns. 
Imperfect information about the availability and location of jobs has an important role 
in determining equilibrium unemployment, and asymmetric information in preventing 
coverage of unemployment risk. Private information by workers as to their own 
characteristics and work or job-seeking effort makes it difficult or impossible for markets 
to offer insurance against labour market risk. Collective policies may improve as well as 
redistribute welfare if based on more useful information and stronger enforcement powers 
than those available to market participants. But policy faces in practice much the same 
information constraints that prevent markets from achieving first-best equilibrium 
configurations. Information problems plague public intervention in both its efficiency-
seeking and equity-seeking dimensions. 
Clearly, workers have no less incentive to decrease their effort when covered by 
social, rather than private, insurance arrangements. The government’s information-
gathering and enforcement capacity may be superior to those of private agents, but are 
clearly not perfect. Hence, imperfect information about effort and/or about personal 
characteristics plagues social policy with the same moral-hazard and adverse-selection 
problems that make it so hard for private markets to provide insurance along with proper 
incentives. On the other side of the same coin, efficient provision of social protection 
cannot eradicate all “unfair” inequality. If individual characteristics and behaviour are not 
verifiable, then richer individuals may take advantage of subsidies or tax exemptions 
meant to benefit a society’s most unfortunate members. 
The remainder of the paper reviews how these insights can inform assessment of 
existing indicators and empirical findings. It does not report statistics, ant it does not 
attempt to provide a comprehensive survey of the relevant literature and evidence. Many 
recent and less-recent surveys already exist, from Bean (1994) to Bertola (1999) to Arpaia 
and Mourre (2005) and Young (2003). Exhaustive (if always debatable) bodies of evidence 
are provided by many of the relevant contributions, such as Bassanini and Duval (2006) 
and Amable, Demmou and Gatti (2007) among the most recent and comprehensive. Here, 
the aim is that of outlining a conceptual guide to interpreting and linking together a vast 
range of indicators, empirical findings, theoretical insights and policy issues. 
The review and discussion of measurement and assessment problems in Section 2 is 
motivated by practical problems in the implementation of theoretically desirable policies 
and, more specifically, by the need to take into account market participant’s reactions and 
implementation issues when assessing the tightness of regulatory constraints. It refers to 
standard policy classifications distinguishing collective constraints on wage determination 
from constraints on dismissals, and “active” from “passive” policies. But it strives to 
consider how the pros and cons of each policy instrument depend on more general aspects, 
highlighting relationships between different policies and more general and deeper aspects 
of the economy’s allocation and distribution mechanisms, including the structural and 
institutional features of markets other than the labour market. As to measurement, 
theoretical models necessarily summarize a complex reality in simple form, and empirical 
assessment of theoretical insights needs to be based on similarly simple summaries of 
complex legislation and customs. Such indicators are useful when account is taken of key 
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theoretical mechanism in their construction, which may combine survey- and legislation-
based indicators with indicators of economic conditions, and when assessing and 
interpreting the stringency of regulation across otherwise similar labor markets. 
Regulatory indicators of institutional “rigidity” can, in turn, be related to a variety of 
related outcome indicators. The resulting empirical picture, reviewed in Section 3 of the 
paper, offers tests of simple theoretical mechanisms as well as validation procedures for 
institutional indicators. The literature has been able to detect meaningful associations 
between institutions and outcomes, both desirable (such as labour income stability) and 
undesirable (such as low and heterogeneous employment rates). A review of cross-country 
evidence highlights relationships between labour-market and other aspects of  structure and 
institutions in different countries, while also making it clear that empirical evidence from 
samples of heterogeneous countries is difficult, especially when they include less-
developed countries (rather than on standard OECD panel data), and emphasizing the 
importance of accounting for structural and historical features in determining both 
institutional choices and labour market outcomes. To the extent that theoretical and 
empirical work supports a view of labour market regulation as a collective choice along 
tradeoffs, that view begs the question of what specific features of the relevant tradeoffs or 
of the collective choice problem may explain the wide variety of labour market 
configurations across countries, and may determine the desirability of labour market 
reforms. 
From such a perspective, Section 4 reviews reform tensions, discussing how the 
determinants of the state and evolution of the labour market regulation’s pros and cons 
may bear on policy choices, and focusing particular on ways in which improved 
opportunities for income and consumption smoothing may make labour market regulation 
less necessary in increasingly integrated open economies, at the same time as international 
competition tends to make labour market regulation less feasible in the absence of 
international policy cooperation. Section 5 offers brief concluding considerations on the 
relevance of inequality concerns to the desirability of labour market regulation, and of 
competitiveness concerns in motivating reforms. 
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1. What regulation aims to do 
If labour-market interactions were perfectly competitive and could rely on complete 
information (and the same were true of all other economic arrangements), then laissez faire 
allocations would be efficient. No policy intervention could increase output, and any 
distributional issues could and should be addressed by “lump-sum” means, without 
interfering with allocation and prices. Real-life markets are neither perfect nor complete, 
and this is especially true of the labour and financial markets that matter most for most 
people’s welfare. Market interactions are more complex and less likely to be optimal in the 
market for labour (as well as in other complex and important markets, e.g. those for 
medical and educational services) than in markets for standardized commodities. This is an 
important reason why taxes, subsidies and regulatory constraints are pervasive in all 
countries’ labour markets: if markets are prone to failure when left to their own devices, it 
is certainly not surprising to see policy-makers try and improve them. 
Before reviewing in more detail such an economic perspective on policies, it is 
important to recognize that, even in the absence of legal and collective contractual 
constraints, wage and employment determination are seldom left completely to market 
determination on the basis of purely economic considerations. As forcefully argued by 
Solow (1990), the peculiarities of labour markets broadly reflects the special character of 
jobs and wages as a crucial determinant of status, as well as the role of social interactions 
in shaping incentives to provide effort. Sellers of standardized goods may not be offended 
by low prices, but a worker’s incentive to provide effort depends importantly on the 
perceived dignity of working conditions and fairness of wages. And while prices are 
determined by competition in impersonal and anonymous markets for goods, job-seekers 
may well feel that competing for fellow workers’ jobs would be socially offensive and 
unfair, and refrain, on the basis of such considerations, from bidding down their wages. 
Thus, wage and employment patterns may well deviate from the marginal productivity 
conditions that would be dictated by profit maximization in simpler markets: while not 
conducive to full equilibrium and high flexibility, socially-motivated interactions may 
support a potentially superior equilibrium characterized by trust and the absence of 
opportunistic behaviour. 
From this point of view, more than economics matters for the interpretation and 
assessment of policy instruments that are not just an imperfect substitute for imperfect 
market interactions (see Agell, 1999, and Argandona, 2001, for related discussion). 
Collective policies can improve the standard of living to individuals who are not in a 
position to access markets on the basis of solidarity criteria similar to those that prevail 
within families, and can ease into society those who might otherwise resort to crime or 
revolution. Such social and political considerations, rather than more directly economic 
mechanisms, explain many features of real-life social policy systems. Labour regulations 
and employment-based contributory schemes, such as those introduced in Bismarck’s 
19th-century Germany and still prevalent in most continental European countries, were 
meant to control not only market forces, but also revolutionary pressure; see Bertola et al. 
(2001) for references on this and other historical experiences, as well as the discussion 
below of the national character of social and labour market policy system and of their 
implications in the current internationalization phase. At a more fundamental level, social 
and legal conventions tend to limit the extent to which market forces are allowed to shape 
individual labour income: union activities are typically exempt from antitrust laws, 1 and 
 
1 Even in the unregulated market economy of the United States, legislation regarding organized 
labour rights is based on the notion that provides that the “labor of a human being is not a 
commodity or article of commerce” (Section 6, Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17). 
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welfare safety nets aim at eliminating the need to bid for employment in order to preserve 
individual dignity, and achieve socially and politically valuable “decommodification” of 
labour (Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
At the opposite extreme, labour market institutions may be viewed not as building 
blocks of social consensus, but as weapons in redistribution struggles between groups of 
economic agents, aimed at reaping larger shares of aggregate output. 2 This perspective, 
while again privileging political and other non-economic factors as determinants of 
observed institutions, focuses on the economic channels through which such tensions play 
out in market interactions. And it emphasizes the advantages of deregulation in that rent-
seeking redistribution efforts tend to dissipate resources, reduce efficiency, and may well 
also foster inequality as income distribution on the basis of political strength need not be 
any less unfair, even in democratic systems, than their distribution on the basis of 
economic strength only. 
In spite of their opposite emphasis and contrasting policy implications, these extreme 
interpretations of the role of labour market institutions have much in common with each 
other, and an extensive interpretation of the “market failures” approach outlined above can 
arguably encompass them in a unified conceptual framework. In reality, social, economic 
and political factors undoubtedly coexist and interact with each other. They can all be 
discussed in terms of deviations from the conceptually useful – albeit wholly unrealistic – 
“perfect markets” paradigm that would deny the usefulness of policy interferences with 
laissez faire market outcomes. And they all interact with the structure of real-life 
economies in ways that can help rationalize policies observed in real life. The importance 
of social norms in preventing opportunistic behaviour depends on the availability of 
alternative contractual enforcement methods. The effectiveness of labour market regulation 
in shifting welfare towards workers depends on the extent to which employers may 
flexibly adjust on other margins, which in turn reflect, among other factors, an economy's 
degree of openness to international trade and factor flows. The extent to which labour 
interests influence institutional arrangements reflects political factors, which in turn 
depends on a country’s social and political structure. Social interaction mechanisms and 
redistribution policies that reduce inequality can efficiently prevent criminal behaviour and 
foster economic as well as social peace. And if notions of efficiency include stability and 
predictability of consumption patterns, as they should if individuals are averse to risk, 
labour market and social policies can address the shortcomings of real-life insurance and 
investment markets. 
In this broad sense, against the background of a hypothetical representative agent 
economy where no policy would need to be implemented, inequality-reducing and income-
shifting policies may after all be rationalized in terms of market failures. Of course, policy 
is also imperfect in practice: like markets, and interacting with them, institutions strive for 
the best possible balance of “flexibility” (efficient allocation of labour) and “security” 
(stability, and equality, of consumption). But social policy and labour market regulation 
cannot in practice reproduce the ideal, undistorted “first-best” configuration that the 
economy would reach if all markets worked perfectly, because institutions and policies 
have to contend with the same imperfections that make them desirable: there is only one 
“first-best”, but very many “second-best” situations, characterized by different distortions, 
and different costs and benefits for various policy interventions. While efficiency would be 
the only objective if a representative-individual view of economic welfare were warranted, 
in reality policy also has distributional objectives and effects. Policies that reduce 
 
2 See, for example, Saint Paul (2000) for a wide-ranging analysis of the politico-economic channel 
with special emphasis on redistribution across categories of workers; and Lindbeck and Snower 
(1988) for analyses of the impact of institutions on the relative welfare of employed “insiders” and 
unemployed “outsiders”. 
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aggregate employment and output would make no sense to a representative agent, but they 
may be appealing for workers if their access to financial markets is difficult, and as such 
lets them earn a larger share of (albeit smaller) aggregate welfare. 
In summary, labour-market institutions aim at increasing aggregate net output, and/or 
at reducing ex post inequality of outcomes for ex ante similar individuals, and/or  at 
redistributing resources across different individuals. They are meant to improve outcomes 
for at least some market participants, and their incentives and ability to do so depend on 
structural features of the underlying system of economic and social interactions. From this 
perspective, the pros and cons of labour market institutions depend on deeper structural 
and political features of different economies. Implementation of legislation and other 
collective action reflects only the relative efficiency of market and policy mechanisms 
from a hypothetical representative agent’s perspective but, in reality, also on whether and 
how financial and other market imperfections prevent workers from taking efficiency 
losses into account (Pissarides, 2001; Alvarez and Veracierto, 2001; Bertola, 2004a). 
The following subsections discuss various dimensions and instruments of 
institutional, legal and policy interference with more or less imperfect labour market 
mechanisms. Needless to say, wages, employment and unemployment effects are all 
interlinked and, for this reason, the discussion of the configurations and outcomes of 
labour markets in the following section will emphasize patterns of co-variation across the 
dimensions considered. 
1.1 Wages, labour costs and employment 
A useful perspective on the distributional implications of labour market policies can 
be easily illustrated in the simple and familiar framework of Figure 1, where workers faced 
by a downward-sloping labour-demand relationship between wages and employment are 
collectively better off if the wage is set at a level higher than that which equates supply and 
demand. The preferred employment level for workers differs from that of a hypothetical 
representative individual interested in maximizing the economy’s total production flow 
over and above the workers’ non-employment opportunities. If workers only earn labour 
income, they do not mind reducing the portion of output that accrues to other factors of 
production. Hence, they prefer wages to be higher than those delivered by competitive 
interactions, and may gladly accept the reduction in employment that delivers that 
outcome. If the wage is increased above the level that equates aggregate supply and 
demand, workers who have no stake in profits or rents are collectively better off. Lower 
employment is a matter of indifference at the margin in laissez faire, and as wages become 
discretely higher than non-employment welfare, the simple sum of workers’ utilities 
continues to increase until the lower welfare of workers who fall back on the outside 
opportunity more than compensates the higher wage earned by the workers who remain 
employed. 3 
 
3 This point is reached sooner when labour supply is steeper. As discussed by Bertola, Blau and 
Kahn (2002), this can explain why labour market regulation tends to cause smaller employment 
losses for worker groups with rigid labour supply (such as prime-age males). 
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Figure 1: Regulation vs. laissez faire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When the wage is higher (and employment lower) than in competitive equilibrium, 
some workers would be willing to work at the going wage but remain unemployed. If they 
were allowed to underbid employed workers, the wage-setting outcome illustrated by 
Figure 1 would unravel to the competitive equilibrium. But while their welfare is lower 
when they fall back on the outside opportunity represented by the labour supply schedule, 
from the collective point of view it can be more than compensated by the higher wage 
earned by those who remain employed. As long as workers disregard the portion of 
production that is not paid out in terms of wages, it is in their collective interest to prevent 
wages from being bid down to the point of indifference. 
This perspective can rationalize legal or contractual constraints that prevent the 
unemployed from underbidding employed workers. Of course, each unemployed worker 
would prefer to be employed, even at a lower wage, and this is the reason why 
underbidding would occur were it not prohibited. Obviously for this outcome to be 
agreeable to all workers, there must exist channels through which the higher wage enjoyed 
by workers who are still employed can be partly distributed to those who are ex-post 
unemployed. Such redistribution is natural if the two groups of workers are members of the 
same family, or the same persons at different ages: the unemployed may be sons and 
daughters of the employed, and can look forward to overall higher labour income over 
their lifetimes. Larger total income for workers and lower employment (and profits) may 
also be supported by a system of  payroll taxation funding non-employment subsidies, such 
as pensions or unemployment benefits or other welfare transfers, or by public-sector 
employment opportunities at favourable wage/effort ratios (Algan, Cahuc and Zylberberg, 
2002). 
The purpose and effect of all such policies are similar to those of an explicit wage 
floor: while the latter prohibit workers from bidding down other workers’ wages, income 
support eliminates the need to bid for employment. While contractual or legal lower 
bounds on wages result in open unemployment, tax-and-subsidy schemes imply a smaller 
Minimum wage, 
or tax wedge 
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 labour force, and public jobs may actually increase the number (if not the effectiveness) of 
employed workers. 
In all cases, the loss of efficiency has negative implications for aggregate production 
and for the economic welfare of a hypothetical representative agent who owned all other 
factors of production, as well as labour, in the aggregate proportions. Limited access to 
financial markets, and lack of ownership of non-labour income flows, can explain why 
workers find it useful to decrease employment even though that decreases total production 
and aggregate welfare. From a different but related perspective, one may view the laissez 
faire employment level and the resulting income distribution as “unfair” when workers do 
not partake of non-labour income. When all workers have the same opportunity cost of 
working, for example, the labour supply schedule is horizontal, and the competitive wage 
is such as to make them strictly indifferent between employment and non-employment in 
laissez faire, none of the economy’s production surplus accrues to workers. 
1.2 Labour market imperfections 
In reality, labour demand and supply interact in more complex ways than in Figure 1. 
The design and implementation of policy intervention are confronted by problems similar 
to those that prevent laissez faire markets from achieving first-best outcomes. Information 
problems, in particular, plague both market interactions and collective intervention 
pursuing efficiency and equity. 
As in other important markets, such as medical services, regulation of working 
conditions is motivated by the inability of individual workers to assess the riskiness of 
their tasks and working conditions, and of employers to credibly attest the safety offered 
by their operations. As in other cases, asymmetric information makes it difficult for 
markets to operate: workers, knowing that it is in their employers’ interest to claim safety 
while saving on costs, should assume a worst-case scenario and, in equilibrium, conditions 
would indeed be dismal, and employment low. Minimum standards, and minimum wages, 
can also be rationalized by employers’ monopsony power in conditions of imperfect 
competition. If workers cannot freely choose among a variety of potential employers, it 
will be in the interest of employers faced by sloping labour supply functions to offer lower 
wages and worse working conditions than would be warranted in competitive equilibrium. 
This behaviour can be motivated by purely economic considerations, in that variations in 
the wages and working conditions offered to the “marginal” employee influence the whole 
wage bill in the eyes of an employer who is faced by a captive pool of workers, and does 
not treat the wage as a market-given constant. The result is that wages are set at a lower 
level than in competitive equilibrium, and employment is also lowered along the labour 
supply curve – rather than along the demand curve, as in Figure 1, where institutions 
moved the market’s wage and employment configuration away from the efficient point 
identified by the intersection of competitive demand and supply schedule. 
If the laissez faire features monopsony power, conversely, it is inefficient from the 
purely economic point of view: a binding minimum wage can increase employment and 
production (see Manning, 2003, for an exhaustive treatment, which also covers the 
discussion of frictional unemployment mechanisms reviewed in the next subsection). The 
monopsony deviation from perfect competition also has distributional implications if (due 
to financial market imperfections, perhaps) workers and employers are distinct groups in 
society, and can of course also be viewed as a politically, socially or even morally “unfair” 
and exploitative practice. 
While imperfections in the price-setting mechanism of labour markets may be 
widespread in laissez faire, and such as to prevent wages from responding to demand and 
supply influences as promptly as the price of commodities, their implications of this for 
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 evaluation of policies is not clear cut. As noted by Manning (2003, p. 365), appreciating 
the extent to which free market interactions are marred by imperfections should simply 
lead one to be open-minded about the impact of policy, which, depending on the 
economy’s configuration and on parameter values, may differ sharply from what a 
competitive baseline would imply. 
1.3 Unemployment and insurance 
Labour market policies, in fact, play more complex roles in models that explicitly 
account for risk and imperfect information problems. Their impact depends on what causes 
unemployment in the first place, on equilibrium interactions, and on details of market 
structure and policy implementation. 
If unemployment is due to the scarcity of information regarding vacant jobs, then 
unemployed workers are engaged in a useful, if time-consuming, activity. If no workers 
were searching for employment opportunities, no job would be found: hence, 
unemployment is a useful input in the production of “matches” between workers and jobs 
(see Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999a, 1999b). The efficiency of laissez faire equilibrium 
in matching models of the labour market, and the possible beneficial welfare effects of 
policy, depend on subtle features of the economic environment. Since market interactions 
are not mediated by competitive price signals, the aggregate productivity of vacancies and 
of search effort need not be appropriately taken into account by individual decision-
makers. In laissez faire, unemployment can be too high but it can also be too low, 
depending on how the benefits of meetings between unemployed workers and employers, 
and on how the likelihood of such “matches” the two parties’ search efforts (Hosios, 
1990). In order to improve on the outcome of private decisions, collective policy would 
need to rely on detailed information regarding the economy’s structure. 
A more general case for policy intervention can be based on the fact that the 
information-gathering and enforcement facilities of collective agencies may well be 
superior to those of private insurance providers. Public unemployment insurance (UI) 
programmes can, in principle, remedy the market’s inability to provide insurance. Private 
insurance contracts encounter “adverse selection” problems, whereby only the workers 
with the highest unemployment risk would find it useful to buy insurance at the market 
rate, which would therefore be unattractive for typical workers, and leave them uninsured. 
The government can solve this problem by making participation mandatory. Since workers 
have no less incentive to decrease their effort when covered by social instead of private 
insurance, of course, “moral hazard” remains a problem: as usual, policy interventions are 
unable to achieve first-best outcomes as their desirability is challenged by their own effects 
on economic agents’ behaviour along margins where they respond to equally imperfect 
market incentives. To some extent, unemployment compensation reduces incentives to 
seek employment. But appropriately designed monitoring and incentive schemes can, in 
principle, be configured so as to ensure that any reduction of productive efficiency is more 
than offset by the benefits of smoother consumption patterns, and the government’s 
superior information and enforcement may well achieve this more easily than private 
market interactions. 
The government’s ability to improve on laissez faire outcomes depends not only on 
its administrative prowess, but also on appropriate policy design, which again depends on 
availability of sufficiently precise information about such subtle structural features as the 
relevance of search effort to job finding probabilities and on workers’ risk aversion and 
access to insurance. When unemployed workers are tempted to exert low search effort, a 
declining pattern of benefits can induce them to search intensely initially, and efficiently 
reduce the duration of unemployment even as the relatively high initial level of benefits 
affords the same overall insurance as a lower constant level would (Shavell and Weiss, 
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 1979). But the different search behaviour of unemployed workers influences the 
equilibrium distribution of wage offers: declining benefits can lead to inefficient rejection 
of low wage offers by unemployed workers receiving high initial benefits, even as their 
stronger search effort increases their rate of matching (Albrecht and Vroman, 2005), and 
high initial benefits can reduce “job retention” effort by currently employed workers 
(Wang and Williamson, 1996). 
More generally, the benefits and costs of UI systems depend on the character of 
information problems and market interactions. Depending on relatively subtle features of 
the economic  environment, for example, the qualitatively broad similarity of models – 
such as those of Shavell and Weiss (1979), Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), Shimer and 
Werning (2005) – sometimes yields dramatically different implications for the relationship 
between the time pattern of unemployment benefits, worker welfare and job finding 
probabilities. These and other theoretical studies let workers be risk averse, and 
unemployment benefits provide some of the insurance against the welfare implications of 
job loss that financial markets are realistically assumed incapable of supplying. The formal 
details of these models are complex, but their broad message is simple: UI policies can, but 
need not, improve welfare and efficiency, depending on their exact configuration and on 
specific features of the economic environment. For example, it can be shown that 
unemployment benefits should be declining over the duration of an unemployment spell if 
workers have no assets and have to be induced to exercise search effort. But if workers’ 
search is simply characterized by acceptance or rejection (on a “reservation-wage” basis) 
of random wage offers, and it is possible for them to save and borrow, then benefits should 
be constant over time if utility has a specific representation (“constant absolute risk 
aversion”) and mildly increasing over time if risk aversion is more realistically inversely 
related to consumption levels. 
1.4 Mobility, hiring and firing 
Risk and insurance more generally interact with all forms of labour mobility, not only 
with those that entail unemployment. In reality, the productivity of any given worker varies 
over time, and is different across firms, geographical locations and occupations. Labour 
demand differences call for different employment levels, and labour demand shocks call 
for labour reallocation. If mobility were costless, workers should be allocated to 
employment opportunities so as to ensure equal productivities and wages across all jobs 
available for labour of a given quality. 
If mobility is costly, however, the marginal productivity must be higher at firms 
whose high labour demand implies hiring, because only a positive spread between the two 
can offset mobility costs. If the costs of mobility are paid by workers, then wages should 
be such as to compensate them, hence higher at hiring firms than at declining firms. And if 
mobility costs are borne by uninsured workers rather than by the well-diversified 
representative agent of a perfect market economy, then the wage instability generated by 
costly arbitrage across employment opportunities has important implications for worker 
behaviour and worker welfare. To the extent that wage fluctuations bear on consumption 
levels (i.e. given imperfect insurance against labour income fluctuations), mobility towards 
good jobs of low-wage workers is financed out of relatively low consumption flows. 
Hence, its costs in utility terms are higher than they would be if labour income risk could 
be insured and pooled at the aggregate level (Bertola, 2004a). In laissez faire, future 
expected wage gains need to be larger when their decreasing marginal utility is smaller 
relative to that of the moving workers’ low consumption. The labour market delivers larger 
wage differentials by allocating less labour to currently more productive jobs or, 
equivalently, by reducing the intensity of labour mobility from low- to high-productivity 
jobs. Thus, lack of insurance harms not only the utility of risk-averse workers, but also the 
market’s productive efficiency. As fewer units of labour move from low-productivity 
Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 21 11 
 towards high-productivity jobs, there tend to be fewer of the latter. Hence, aggregate 
production is low in an economy where risk-averse workers finance mobility. When 
mobility costs bear on individual workers’ consumption, rather than on aggregate 
resources, decentralized decisions fail to maximize the latter. 
Institutions influence the responsiveness of wages and employment to different and 
changing circumstances, and are therefore relevant to the welfare and productivity 
implications of imperfect insurance in the presence of labour mobility costs. Labour 
market dynamics are influenced not only by limited wage-setting flexibility, but also by 
regulatory constraints on hiring and firing, and in particular by employment protection 
legislation (EPL). In European countries, EPL typically requires that termination of 
individual regular employment contracts be motivated and subject to court appeal, and that 
collective dismissals be conditional on administrative procedures involving formal 
negotiations with workers’ organizations and with local or national authorities. 
Such provisions do have the intended effect of “protecting” jobs at times of declining 
labour demand, when firing costs smooth out job losses and reduce downward wage 
pressure. Just because such a situation is costly for employers, however, it is optimal for 
them to refrain from hiring in upturns, so as to reduce the desirability of labour shedding in 
downturns. Hence, EPL need not affect employment on average. In terms of simple 
demand-and-supply relationships, such as those illustrated in Figure 1, the marginal 
productivity of labour should be lower than the wage when employment is declining. 
Firing a marginal worker entails firing costs as well as wage-cost savings, but it should 
symmetrically be higher than the wage when employment is increasing, and the marginal 
worker’s costs include expected future firing costs as well as the current wage. Thus, the 
implications of EPL are similar to those of labour taxes for expanding firms, and to those 
of employment subsidies for downsizing firms. If employment fluctuations are efficient in 
laissez faire, EPL obviously reduces production and profits. Unlike labour taxes, however, 
it does not do so by reducing employment on average, because its contrasting effects on 
employers’ propensity to hire and fire reduce employment volatility but affect its average 
level ambiguously (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990). Since tighter EPL does reduce the 
propensity to hire in response to labour demand shocks, for a given intensity of such 
shocks it makes it more difficult for unemployed workers to re-enter employment: thus, it 
lengthens unemployment spells. In this respect its effects are similar to those of UI which, 
by reducing search intensity and increasing workers’ reservation wages, also implies a 
slower exit rate from unemployment. EPL also influences job separation rates: as it makes 
it less likely that employed workers will lose their jobs, it concentrates unemployment on 
young labour market entrants. 
Since EPL prevents reallocation of employed workers from less to more productive 
jobs, it reduces the overall efficiency of production. Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) 
emphasize this effect in an equilibrium model where EPL is represented by a tax on all 
separations (and, since the revenue of taxes is rebated to individuals, larger non-labour 
income reduces employment through labour supply). As firms hoard labour during cyclical 
downswings and restrain hiring during cyclical upswings, the average rate of profit is 
decreased and their volatility increased, relative to their unconstrained maximum value. 
Firms should of course attempt to reduce such volatility by any means available to them, 
for example by varying work-time when this is possible. If wage determination were left to 
market forces, their volatility would also increase, and institutional constraints on labour 
shedding by firms might well do little to reduce the volatility of individual labour incomes. 
In the extreme case where workers have no bargaining power, wages could respond to the 
labour demand shocks that EPL is meant to protect workers so strongly as to restore 
equality of wages and marginal productivity. Wage stability over time is then a natural 
complement to EPL, and results in cross-sectional wage compression when labour demand 
shocks occur at the level of sectors, regions, industries or firms, rather than at the 
aggregate level. 
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 1.5 Efficiency and policy interactions 
It is obvious that labour market regulation would be ineffective if it could be offset by 
contractual interactions in perfect markets. For example, EPL provisions mandating 
severance pay would be ineffective if workers could sign binding contracts renouncing 
severance rights in advance of termination: making such contracts a condition of 
employment might well be in the individual interest, not only of employers, but also of 
unemployed workers who would otherwise not be hired, but they are naturally 
unenforceable in court in countries that treat protection from unfair dismissals as a 
fundamental, non-marketable right of workers. More interestingly, severance pay 
provisions could be offset in perfect markets by ex-ante payments, such as hiring bonuses 
paid by unemployed workers to reluctant employers, or indeed by lower wage rates 
(Lazear, 1990). As long as workers can borrow and lend and obtain insurance in perfect 
markets, in fact, the timing of labour income flows is immaterial, and market forces would 
naturally tend to preserve efficient laissez faire outcomes. In such conditions, enforcement 
of EPL might be possible if institutions also constrain other payment flows, for example, 
by also mandating minimum wages that make it impossible for workers to “pay” in 
advance for their own severance benefits. In such conditions, it would be harmful, since 
markets would be working perfectly in its absence. 
Markets do not work perfectly, and policy need not be able to target their 
imperfections as effectively and precisely as would be desirable, because the ability of 
governments to interfere beneficially with imperfect labour market interactions depends on 
knowledge of relatively detailed features of those interactions, as discussed above. Still, 
markets and policies together determine the efficiency of labour markets. Despite their 
tendency to under-employ labour by allocating workers to unemployment or relatively 
unproductive jobs, UI and EPL may increase productive efficiency in the presence of 
distortions. UI, while decreasing search intensity per unit of time, can increase the overall 
amount of search when workers would inefficiently cut off search time in its absence. 
Similarly, EPL can induce employers to retrain workers rather than fire them, and this may 
increase labour productivity (net of retraining costs) when financial market imperfections 
would otherwise prevent workers from financing their own retraining. To the extent that 
EPL specifies payments to workers directly (rather than administrative procedures 
representing dead-weight costs from the point of view of employers and employees), it 
may facilitate reallocation of displaced workers who would be liquidity constrained in the 
absence of redundancy payments. 
UI and EPL are broadly substitutable rather than complementary in these respects. In 
an important respect, however, UI and EPL are complementary: by reducing the intensity 
of labour market flows, EPL makes it harder to find a job for those who are unemployed. 
Thus, long-term unemployment benefits (or invalidity pensions and early-retirement 
provisions) are all the more appealing for workers when EPL is stringent. The possibility 
that UI and EPL may improve efficiency depends on imperfect market provision of 
reallocation-oriented and skill-improving investments. 
Since laws may not be legally overridden by contractual provisions, EPL interferes 
with individual contractual freedom, just like minimum wages and administrative 
extension of collective agreements similarly interferes with individual wage-contracting 
freedom. Legislation often mandates administrative procedures, involving formal 
negotiations with workers’ organizations and with local or national authorities, when large 
employers wish to proceed to collective dismissals or plant closures. These and other 
aspects of labour law do aim at addressing informational problems and ascertain whether 
dismissals are “fair”: the letter of the law never prevents employers from firing 
incompetent or lazy workers. However, countries where EPL is stringent do require them 
to prove – through regrettably costly court procedures – that termination is justified, and 
administrative review of collective redundancies is generally aimed at ascertaining that 
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 employers have properly considered ways to perform internal adjustment, and encouraging 
them to compensate workers for the “social” costs of redundancies – costs that financial 
markets may fail to internalize properly to firms’ dynamic profit maximization problems. 
While it would be quite naive to expect government interventions to provide at no cost the 
same insurance that markets find it impossible to provide, it would also be naive to 
presume that properly designed policies cannot go some way towards resolving the 
relevant imperfections (Bertola, 2004a). 
1.6 Activation and flexicurity 
In general, poor laissez faire opportunities for financing workers’ retraining and 
relocation may depend on a variety of features of the economic environment. They may be 
addressed directly by policy instruments such as public training and job-matching facilities 
for the unemployed, i.e. “active labour market policies” (ALMPs). These policies combine 
forms of income support with “active” measures meant to ensure that labour is not idle (as 
it might under a pure UI scheme) or employed in low-productivity jobs (as EPL tends to 
imply), but is retrained and reallocated so as to ensure that it is used efficiently. Such 
schemes are clearly attractive if public agencies can fund them more efficiently than 
financial markets, again as a result of a superior information-processing and enforcement 
capacity. Creation of public jobs may also be beneficial if the government is better able 
than laissez faire markets to make use of labour services. 
Policy can target such problems more or less directly, but different policies all bear on 
the extent to which labour can be “activated”, or moved from less productive (or almost 
completely unproductive, such as unemployment) to more productive allocations (Bertola, 
2000b). The currently popular “flexicurity” concept can be usefully framed in terms of the 
basic tradeoff highlighted here between distributional concerns and production efficiency: 
of course, it is important to protect workers’ well-being from labor market shocks, as well 
as to ensure that their labour is flexibly allocated to the best possible use. The relative 
importance of the two objectives depends on underlying features of the economy, such as 
the extent to which financial markets may offer security to workers without policy 
intervention in the labour market, and the urgency of labour reallocation concerns in the 
face of more or less intense productivity and good market shocks. The ease with which the 
two objectives may both be achieved depends on details of policy implementation: active 
labour market policy and activation-oriented UI systems can certainly foster labour 
reallocation and increase employment, but administration of such programmes is not 
inexpensive. The Danish “flexicurity” approach yields high levels of employment and 
productivity at the same time as it affords stable consumption opportunities to workers, but 
it is doubtful that many countries could, like Denmark, spend some 5 per cent of GDP on 
labour market policies without encountering very serious tax collection and administration 
problems. 
1.7 Training 
To highlight how financial and other market imperfections bear on the desirability of 
labour market regulation, it is useful to consider how imperfect markets may be unable to 
achieve efficient outcomes as regards training and retraining of workers (Becker, 1964). In 
general, markets and contracts cannot provide appropriate levels of general training 
because it is difficult to make believable promises in two different respects. On the one 
hand, young workers, whose income and wealth may already be insufficient to fund 
desired consumption flows, cannot borrow easily in order to pay for their own training, 
because the financial market need not believe that such loans will be repaid. On the other 
hand, it is also difficult for workers to obtain training from their employers, because if 
training is at least partly “general” and therefore useful when employed by other firms, 
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 workers cannot be believed it they promise that, after their productivity is increased by 
training, they will be working at the current wage for the employer who trained them. 
There is of course also “specific” human capital, useful only when employed in a particular 
job. This can and should be financed by employers, since workers cannot appropriate 
returns to such investments (in the form of higher wages) by threatening to quit and work 
elsewhere. 
Of course, general training could be financed directly by governments, as in the case 
of ALMPs. Aspects of labour market rigidity that constrain wage setting, however, can 
also foster training. When financial constraints prevent workers from investing in their 
own “general” human capital, i.e. skills that are useful in jobs other than their current one, 
allowing wages to be bargained by individual workers would make it impossible for firms 
as well to provide such training: as employers foresee that investing in workers’ skills 
would simply result in higher wages, as workers would otherwise quit, the benefits of 
training would only accrue to workers, not employers. As pointed out by Acemoglu and 
Pischke (1998, 1999), labour market imperfections or wage-setting constraints can offset 
such financial market imperfections. If workers cannot threaten to quit directly to other 
jobs because labour mobility is constrained by search costs or other frictions, or cannot 
negotiate their own wages because industry-level contracts are binding, individual firms 
will be able to provide training in generally useful skills without fear that other firms (and, 
in equilibrium, workers) will benefit from their training expenditure. 
It has been argued that hiring and firing regulations promote long-lasting work 
relationships that encourage investment in human capital, over and beyond what could be 
achieved by laissez faire interactions and enforceable contracts (see, for example, Piore, 
1986). While this is a conceptually appealing notion, it is not obvious that employment 
rigidity would have beneficial effects through this channel. Faster turnover makes 
investment in specific human capital less productive, hence the intuitive appeal of the link 
between labour market rigidity and human capital investment incentives. In an 
environment where contractual incompleteness prevents general training, however, EPL 
need not strengthen job attachment in a way that fosters training incentives. While it is true 
that EPL implies longer tenures, in fact, this need not lengthen the planning horizon for 
general training investments. EPL cannot force workers to remain with employers who 
have financed their general or specific training, so it is hard to see why such financing and 
training should be more intense if EPL is tightened in that realistic situation. EPL may only 
induce employers to retain workers they would otherwise fire, so training would indeed 
possibly increase with EPL if workers were, rather unrealistically, in a better position than 
their employers to finance specific training. 
1.8 Financial market imperfections and social policies 
As noted above, information problems can prevent efficiency of labour mobility 
between jobs and occupations, and UI (Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999) or EPL (Bertola, 
2004a) can address efficiency and insurance issues when financial markets are realistically 
incomplete. 
In these and other respects, labour market policies interact importantly with 
imperfections in other markets and with more general government policies. Financial 
market imperfections are particularly likely to be relevant, and their interaction with labour 
market regulation can be characterized in some generality recognizing that the poor 
availability of insurance and other financial instruments implies that the welfare of 
workers, unlike that of the “risk neutral” individuals of many dynamic labour market 
models, is higher when their labour income and consumption are stable over time. In a 
world of perfect and complete markets, workers could be indifferent to the timing of their 
earnings and “buy” access to jobs when EPL severance provisions discourage employers 
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 from hiring them, and consumption could be stabilized by “contingent contracts” in the 
face of labour income fluctuations. 
But real-life financial markets are poorly equipped to deal with job-market risk, 
because an individual’s wage and employment depend importantly on luck (so that 
insurance would be  welcome), but also on effort (which is hardly observable, bothersome, 
and unavoidably wanes if lack of effort simply increases the chance of receiving insurance 
payments, rather than that of having to reduce consumption). In reality, access to financial 
instruments and consumption-smoothing opportunities is clearly far from perfect, and takes 
a variety of forms. In pre-industrial societies, family-level and village-level interactions 
could take care of smoothing out idiosyncratic shocks within narrow, subsistence-oriented 
economic systems. In the large-scale economic systems of modern societies, either 
organized financial markets or state-organized redistribution schemes are called upon to 
smooth out consumption fluctuations across individuals. Redistributive labour income 
taxation has beneficial effects in the absence of insurance markets (Varian, 1980, and other 
references in Agell, 2002). Labour-income stabilization may be intuitively beneficial in the 
absence of the consumption smoothing afforded by credit and other financial markets: 
Hansen and Imrohoroglu’s (1992) numerical study, for example, indicates that UI can 
address the negative welfare implications of liquidity constraints, albeit imperfectly so if 
insurance engenders moral hazard in the labour market. 
In practice, both markets and redistribution play a role in all developed economies, 
and both fail to insure individuals perfectly against bad luck, for neither could do so 
without eliminating incentives for individual effort in seeking more highly productive 
work opportunities. There are important differences across countries as regards formal and 
informal provision of consumption-smoothing instruments, and features of financial and 
labour markets are connected through a variety of mechanisms. At the most general level, 
as mentioned, imperfect financial market access can rationalize the low level of 
employment and large wage bill of configurations such as that illustrated in Figure 1. To 
support such outcomes, it must be the case not only that workers collectively can set labour 
costs at a level different from the competitive equilibrium one, but also that their objective 
function is different from that of a perfect market economy’s representative individuals 
(and disregards profits). Perfect capital and financial markets would support efficient 
production and maximization of a representative individual’s welfare, and lump-sum 
redistribution at a hypothetical pre-market stage could cleanly disentangle distributional 
and efficiency concerns. But if workers, as a group, do not have access to the financial 
markets where claims to employers’ profits are traded, they and their representatives may 
well favour outcomes that reduce non-labour income more than they increase labour 
income, as in the simple collective wage-setting or taxation example above. 
If employers (as stockholders) have better access to financial markets than workers, 
then EPL may shift the costs of adjustment to employers, and reduce or eliminate the 
adverse consequences of job loss for uninsured workers (Bertola, 2004a). Also, when 
private financial and labour market contracts cannot shelter workers’ consumption from 
idiosyncratic labour demand shocks and ensure that labour reallocation takes place 
efficiently, collective interventions can try and achieve both goals. In the stylized 
framework outlined above, improvement on the laissez faire outcome entails taxing the 
payroll of high-productivity jobs, subsidizing that of low-productivity jobs, and reducing 
the workers’ cost of moving from the latter to the former. Intuitively, taxing high wage 
realizations with relatively low marginal utility and subsidizing the consumption of 
workers who earn low wages makes sense from an ex ante insurance point of view. Since 
equalization of take-home pay would remove workers’ incentives to move towards high-
productivity jobs, a policy package meant to mimic a first-best allocation also needs to 
finance mobility out of aggregate resources, subsidizing mobility as needed to ensure that 
additional production is valued on the risk-neutral basis appropriate for idiosyncratic 
shocks. 
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UI can similarly pool risks at the economy-wide level, or at least across employed and 
unemployed workers, depending on the details of its funding. The relevant financial 
market imperfections can rationalize schemes meant to buffer the consumption impacts of 
labour market shocks. The costs imposed on workers by job loss and by the subsequent 
mobility towards other jobs motivate both UI, which offer income subsidies to unemployed 
workers financed by payroll contributions, and EPL, which imposes costly procedures 
and/or redundancy payments upon individual and collective redundancies. Both 
institutions tend to reduce labour mobility across jobs: UI tends to increase reservation 
wages of unemployed workers, who are therefore less likely to obtain new employment; 
and EPL diminishes not only employers’ incentives to fire redundant workers, but also 
their incentives to hire, since increasing employment in response to possibly temporary 
increases in labour demand increases the chance of encountering firing restrictions in the 
future. Both institutions also tend to reduce wage differentials, since the availability of 
unemployment subsidies limits competitive pressure on low wages, and EPL-induced 
redundancy payments can finance mobility towards new jobs, implying lower wage 
differentials in equilibrium between expanding and shrinking employment opportunities 
(Bertola, 2004a). 
EPL can also induce deadweight costs in individual employment relationships when it 
mandates administrative or legal procedures, or severance taxes are paid to a central 
revenue pool. This looks wasteful but, just like the lower employment induced by 
collective bargaining in Figure 1, can be rationalized by workers’ limited access to 
financial markets. Job “security” could hardly be valuable if perfect insurance were already 
available and, if suitable inter-temporal state-contingent contracts were available, then 
mandatory redundancy payments to dismissed workers could and should be offset by 
properly adjusting contractual payments. To the extent that lower turnover stabilizes 
workers’ income and consumption at the expense of production efficiency, “wasteful” EPL 
can be beneficial to workers as a group if their share of a smaller welfare pie is sufficiently 
increased by distorted hiring-and-firing patterns and the resulting stability of labour 
incomes. Then, smaller wage differentials and easier mobility not only improve workers’ 
welfare through a standard consumption-smoothing channel but also, by better aligning 
individual mobility incentives to aggregate rates of transformation, tend to improve 
productive efficiency as indexed by the proportion of high-productivity employment in the 
model. Thus, addressing this imperfection would be in the interest of employers as well as 
in that of workers. 
Of course, not only financial but also labour markets are imperfect. Amable and Gatti 
(2004), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Koeniger and Prat (2007), and others highlight 
theoretical and empirical relationships between labour and product market regulation. 
Product market regulation bears on the effects (and the desirability) of labour market 
regulation, because if product market competition is not intense due to entry restriction or 
regulatory constraints, then rents will be higher, and rent-seeking motives stronger on the 
part of unions and workers’ political representatives, at the same time as monopolistic 
price setting keeps real wages low. 
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2. Measuring institutions 
The brief review of policy interactions in the previous section was focused on the 
trade-off between productive efficiency (brought about by high employment, especially at 
high-productivity employment opportunities) and ex post inequality (as may be generated 
by the inability of laissez faire markets to provide adequate insurance in the face of labour-
market shocks). As noted above, however, policies and institutions may also be motivated 
by ex ante distributional goals, the pursuit of which typically entails efficiency losses in the 
realistic absence of lump-sum instruments. In particular, it is easier for organized labour to 
obtain a larger share of producer surplus not only when unemployment benefits provide a 
credible outside option in wage negotiations, but also when competitive wage 
underbidding is made difficult by minimum wages or by administrative extension of 
centrally negotiated wage rates. EPL per se need not affect average employment at given 
wages, nor need it increase workers’ bargaining power in otherwise unconstrained wage-
setting processes. In combination with wage-setting constraints, however, it may imply 
that workers who are employed (chiefly prime-age males) enjoy not only job security and 
wage stability, but also high wage rates. 
This section discusses how empirical measures can serve as counterparts of the 
previous section’s theoretical concepts. It reviews comparability problems across countries 
and over time of different measurement techniques, such as surveys of perceived 
regulatory stringency, reviews of legal norms, and case-based enforcement indicators. 4 
Assessment of EPL stringency provides a good framework for discussion of more general 
measurement issues and, for this reason, will be treated first, and more extensively, in what 
follows. 
2.1 EPA: Rules, surveys, court decisions 
From the economic point of view, what matters is the cost of dismissals to employers, 
and whether the costs take the form of payments to workers (thereby influencing wage-
setting) or of payments to third parties in the context of administrative and judicial 
procedures. Not only the size, but also the character of legal provisions regarding dismissal 
of redundant employees differs widely across European and American labour markets. In 
general, what is required is that job termination be motivated and that workers be given 
reasonable notice, or financial compensation in lieu of notice. In practice, enforcement of 
such laws is based on the workers’ right to appeal against termination. Hence, employment 
reduction entails lengthy negotiations with workers’ organizations and/or legal procedures. 
Even in the relatively unregulated American labour market, experience-rated 
unemployment insurance contributions make it costly at the margin for firms to reduce 
employment (Card and Levine, 1994). The qualitative character of individual and 
collective dismissals regulation is similar, but more restrictive, in most European countries. 
Measuring how much more restrictive is not straightforward. Some aspects of job-security 
provisions, such as the number of months of notice required for individual and collective 
redundancies, are readily quantified; Grubb and Wells (1993) compile and discuss the 
relevant institutional information for a cross-section of industrial countries, and Lazear 
(1990), Addison and Grosso (1996), and others also consider such simple indicators’ time-
series behaviour. Also, rules regarding dismissal of individual employees can interfere 
with firms' decisions to adjust overall employment levels. 
 
4 See Nardo et al. (2005) for a discussion of indicator-construction methods for the general purpose 
of comparing conditions and performance across countries. 
 Highly relevant aspects of job-security provisions, such as the willingness of labour 
courts to entertain appeals by fired workers and the interpretation placed by judges on the 
rather vague notion of “just cause” for termination, are more difficult to quantify precisely. 
While their variety and complexity makes it hard to measure precisely the stringency of 
firing constraints in each labour market, available indicators of job security provisions 
(such as the length of notice periods, the percentage of dismissals brought before labour 
courts, and the size of redundancy payments) are positively correlated with each other. 
This makes it possible to assess the relative stringency of job security constraints on a 
“ranks” basis, without taking a stand on the relative importance of the various aspects: if a 
country’s job security provisions are stronger than another’s provisions in all respects, we 
will know for sure that dismissals are more difficult in the former than in the latter. Early 
rank-based indicators were computed by Bertola (1990), and were based on highly (rank) 
correlated survey-based and objective measures of EPL stringency. The approach was 
refined by OECD researchers (see Grubb and Wells, 1993), and developed into the 
influential OECD indicators of regular-contract, secondary and overall employment 
rigidity indicators. It is important to keep in mind that rank-based indicators are not 
comparable over time: changes over time of a country’s EPL stringency need bear no 
relationship to the ranking of those provisions within a group of countries whose EPL 
provisions may well themselves be changing. 
EPL can be measured at several different levels and with different instruments. It is 
possible to examine and classify legislative provisions (such as the mandated length of 
notice periods). Or one may assess the stringency of those provisions in practice, on the 
basis of observed outcomes. On the one hand, laws always allow dismissals on the basis of 
some conditions, and their stringency depends on how those conditions are assessed by the 
courts; on the other hand, the extent to which institutional constraints are binding for 
employers depends on the intensity of profit-maximizing employment fluctuations. 
Survey-based measures of EPL stringency have been constructed by Emerson (1988), and 
more recently by Di Tella and McCulloch (2005), on the basis of employers’ replies to 
questions regarding their perceptions of regulation as a burden on business operations. The 
resulting indicators are rather tightly related to employment stability patterns in the ways 
predicted by all-else-given theoretical relationships, and also prove to be related to 
unemployment and wage indicators. As gauges of the forces exerted by regulation on 
laissez faire economic interactions, however, survey-based indicators have to be treated 
with caution, because the perceived stringency of regulation also depends on economic 
conditions: employers may well be less inclined to complain about dismissal restrictions 
when a slowdown makes it highly desirable for them to reduce employment, for example, 
than in a cyclical upswing. In practice, Pierre and Scarpetta (2006) find that legal and 
perceived stringency indicators co-vary rather well across countries. 
Measures of EPL implementation may also be constructed on the basis of court 
decision statistics (Bertola, Boeri and Cazes, 2000). Like all other indicators, these offer 
additional interesting information if combined with the relevant theoretical insights. Of 
course, courts do exercise judgement when implementing the law and, as always, their 
judgement is influenced by both economic and other considerations. Empirically, court 
decisions are influenced by local labour market conditions, as judges are more likely to 
decide in favour of worker reinstatement when and where unemployment is high in Italian 
data (Ichino, Polo and Rettore, 2003); but they also appear to depend on judges’ 
ideological bias in German data where political influences on judge appointments can be 
detected (Berger and Neugart, 2006). The influence of economic variables and labour 
market conditions is in fact not surprising in an incomplete-markets environment, where 
judges are supposed to try and implement efficient sharing and allocation on the basis of an 
assessment of the individual case’s circumstances rather than of contingencies completely 
stipulated by laws and contracts. Since the welfare implications of dismissal or 
reinstatement for a given risk-averse and uninsured worker clearly depend on job-finding 
probabilities, it is quite fair and unsurprising that otherwise similar cases may be decided 
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differently in regions which differ in that respect. More generally, economic conditions do 
matter for the practical implications of nominally similar provisions: for example, there is 
empirical evidence that legal provisions meant to protect individual employees become 
more binding during cyclical downturns, when collective rather than individual dismissals 
are desirable for employers, in the unionized sectors of the American labour market 
(Donohue and Siegelman, 1995). 
Evidence of ideological influences on court decisions, conversely, indicates once 
again that, not only market interactions, but also policy implementation are perhaps 
unavoidably imperfect, and the uncertainties and biases entailed by judicial processes lead 
many economists to favour their replacement with rule-based automatic severance 
payments. 5 The efficiency of court procedures, accordingly, depends in theory on the 
degree of financial market completeness, and on the ability of the judicial process to 
collect and process information efficiently about the parties’ circumstances. The empirical 
relationship between legal and survey-based measures of EPL stringency should, in 
principle, be shaped by such features as the frequency and size of the demand and cost 
shocks determining employment fluctuations (and, when surveys refer to current 
conditions, they should also depend on the sign and size of such shocks received by 
individual firms), as well as by the intensity of politico-economic influences on judicial 
processes. 
2.2 Wage setting 
In different countries and different periods, different policies are implemented 
differently and more or less incisively (see the discussion in the next section), and can be 
interpreted in terms of distributional conflicts taking place under structural constraints, 
represented by the downward slope of the labour demand function. Not only rights of 
union organization and the ability to enforce collectively-agreed wages on all workers, but 
also the ability to use non-market instruments to redistribute the wage bill from high-wage 
employed workers to unemployed workers, matter for the desirability and feasibility of the 
low-employment outcome. 
From the theoretical point of view, what matters is not only whether institutional 
constraints exist on the overall level and dispersion of wages alters laissez faire, but also 
how their character and motivation affects labour market outcomes. In practice, various 
aspects of union bargaining arrangements have different effects on aggregate and 
disaggregate wages and employment levels. As is the case along the other institutional 
dimension, construction and interpretation of wage-setting indicators should be focused on 
theoretical effects of interest. 
Measures of union density (the percentage of employees who are union members) are 
easy to obtain, but need not be relevant to the union’s power to set wages, which is 
affected very importantly by the “coverage” of collectively bargained wages, i.e. by 
extension of their effects to employees who are not union members. The coverage of 
employment by union contracts does not capture all theoretical channels of interest, 
however, because a given degree of coverage may result from a patchwork of sector- or 
firm-specific bargains, or by negotiations involving employers, workers and often 
governments at higher and possibly economy-wide levels. The extent to which the latter is 
the case can be assessed by indicators of “corporatism”, “coordination” or “centralization”, 
which are unavoidably rather subjective, but aim at capturing theoretically distinct 
 
5 See the discussion of “experience rating” and other ways of mimicking market mechanisms in 
Blanchard and Tirole (2003) and references therein. 
 characteristics of wage bargaining systems. “Coordination” may offset the greater 
bargaining power associated with more extensive union coverage if negotiations occur at a 
level, and in a fashion, where the outcome can be properly shaped by the market-wide and 
macroeconomic implications of high and rigid wages: in the absence of coordination, 
strategic interactions between different firms, sectors or regions results in inferior 
employment outcomes (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988). “Centralization” per se has less 
favorable theoretical implications for the efficiency of labour allocation, as it tends to 
impose a degree wage uniformity – if only because contracts cannot be excessively 
detailed – across differently productive workers, firms or regions. 
In the data, density and coverage are broadly positively correlated, with the United 
States and Japan featuring low levels and Scandinavian countries high levels of both. Some 
countries, notably France and Spain, have high coverage but low density. Since union 
enrolment data may be more relevant to financing of union activities than to the objectives 
and collective character of wage setting, coverage data are theoretically more relevant than 
density. Unionization indicators, of course, may in turn depend on deeper features of the 
economies, because unions (like other collective institutions) can usefully address market 
imperfections (Checchi and Lucifora, 2002). Unions may in fact be in a better position 
than governments to do so, as politico-economic interactions between organized interests 
may well be as seriously flawed as those mediated by markets between individual, fully 
selfish choices. 
2.3 UI, taxes and activation 
Assessing taxation is also potentially difficult, in light of real-life’s tax code 
complications and, in particular, of the implications of progressive taxation and earned-
income tax credits for the extensive (participation) and intensive (work-time, given 
participation) dimensions of labour supply decisions. In practice, the OECD computes and 
publishes tax-code-based estimates of taxation in the “average production worker” and 
some non-average income and family composition cases, in each country and each year: 
(UI replacement rates are also published on a “net” basis, taking into account whether 
benefits are taxable or not in different countries.) It is possible and may be appropriate to 
include in the wedge between the labour costs paid by employers and net wages accruing 
to workers not only income taxes, but also consumption taxes and mandatory social 
security contributions (as in the dataset used by Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel, 2005). 
An important and difficult issue is that of assessing the extent to which social security 
systems link contributions to future benefits, such as pensions: if such a link were strong 
and actuarially fair, and financial markets functioned well, then individual workers’ labour 
supply decisions would count contributions as (deferred) pay, rather than taxes. Of course, 
the link between contributions and entitlements is not tight in most social security systems 
(and not surprisingly so because, as usual, complete neutrality of regulation would make it 
impossible to understand why it is imposed at all). But there is relevant variation across the 
welfare state “models” discussed in the next section, and some evidence that, in the cross-
country dataset discussed here, it affects the relevance of contribution rates to supply 
decisions and employment outcomes (Disney, 2004). 
As in the case of EPL, real-life UI systems are much more complicated than any 
tractable economic model as regards rules regarding waiting periods, eligibility, duration 
and determination of unemployment benefits. But, again, theory offers guidance as to how 
the crucial aspects of UI systems should be summarily measured in order to gauge their 
(positive) effects on consumption stability, and (negative, albeit unavoidable) effects on 
effort and re-employment. Theory can then inform interpretation of relationships between 
outcomes and available indexes, which typically refer the replacement rate at the beginning 
of an unemployment spell for a typical “average production worker” or other hypothetical 
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 unemployed persons, the average duration of benefits, or (so as to capture both level and 
duration aspects) the average replacement rate of all unemployed workers. The evidence 
broadly indicates that the duration, rather than the generosity of benefits, is associated with 
aggregate unemployment rates across countries, and this is consistent with the (also 
empirical) fact that most of the cross-country differences are observed in long-term 
unemployment, and with theoretical mechanisms whereby declining (or soon-expiring) 
benefits should elicit job-search effort. 
While UI is classified as a “passive” policy, increasing awareness of its effects on 
search effort and propensity to accept jobs motivate reforms intended to reduce them. This 
would make it very important to assess the extent to which counseling requirements and 
conditionality rules offset those effects. This is far from easy to do on a cross-country 
comparable basis. More generally, indicators of Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP) 
would need (like all other institutional indicators) to be constructed and interpreted in 
terms of their theoretical impact (as well as of their costs), but cross-country comparisons 
may only be based on expenditure data (as available from the OECD Public Social 
Expenditure and from the EU ESSPROS datasets), which can hardly be a good gauge of 
efficacy and efficiency. Within-country assessments of the effects of the ALMP find that 
activation measures are often ineffective because they fail to target suitable individuals 
(see Kluve and Schmidt, 2002), even before accounting for their high fiscal costs (Martin 
and Grubb, 2001) which of course depend in turn on the structure of the relevant tax 
system. 
2.4 Institutional co-variation and welfare state “models” 
Labour markets are never completely deregulated, and are regulated very differently 
across countries. In European countries, legislation meant to endow workers with some 
bargaining power and to insure them against health, unemployment and old-age hazards 
was introduced at times of actual or feared social unrest: in Bismarck’s industrializing 
Germany or in Lord Beveridge’s post-war United Kingdom. As discussed above, it can be 
efficient to try and provide insurance through mandatory government schemes when 
information and legal enforcement problems make it difficult for private markets to do so. 
But public schemes are not immune from such problems, and tend to reduce employment 
as, for example, recipients of unemployment subsidies reduce work effort. 
Such efficiency losses are more easily affordable by richer societies, and Europe’s 
fast and stable post-war growth was unsurprisingly accompanied by development of 
increasingly extensive legislation and co-decision powers by unions. By the early 1970s, 
the institutional structure of labour markets was distinctively different, not only across the 
United States and Europe as a whole, but also across countries within Europe, where 
labour market policies play different roles in different welfare state models (Bertola et al., 
2001). In Nordic countries, a tradition of full employment and universal welfare is based 
on generous unemployment benefits and a very important role for active labour market 
policies (including job creation in the public sector). The Bismarckian model of continental 
countries such as France and Germany features centralized wage determination and 
stringent EPL, and contributory pension, health and unemployment insurance programmes 
that, as mentioned, may – to the extent that they link benefits to contributions – not have 
strong labour supply and employment implications. The Beveridgian model of the United 
Kingdom and other Anglo-Saxon countries features social assistance safety financed by 
general taxation and comparatively light regulation of wage determination and 
employment relationships. 
As stressed at the end of Section 1, labour market regulation interacts importantly 
with the structure of other markets. Measures of product market regulation have been 
recently constructed by Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud (2000), Conway and Nicoletti 
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 (2006), and others facing similar problems and adopting similar solutions to those 
discussed above as regards indicators of EPL and other labour market institutions. These 
and other indicators of regulation and social policy cluster across countries in sensible 
ways, both as regards the overall intensity of institutional interference in labour market 
outcomes, and substitutability of complementarities across different policy instruments. 
For example, as discussed above, UI and EPL address similar problems, and are to 
some extent substitutable to each other. The American labour market features both loose 
EPL and stingy UI, perhaps reflecting availability of other wage- and consumption-
smoothing instruments such as international and domestic labour mobility, and well-
developed financial markets. Other Anglo-Saxon countries also cluster in low-UI, low-
EPL configurations, while within continental Europe and Scandinavia, differences in the 
intensity of institutional interference are hard to gauge, because more generous UI and 
lower EPL (as in Scandinavian countries, where ALMPs are also an important feature of 
the institutional environment) would need to be compared with the less generous UI and 
much tighter EPL of Mediterranean countries (such as Italy and Spain). Such variation 
may be interpreted not as much in terms of differences in the intensity of the problems 
labour market regulation is meant to address, as in terms of differences in the ability of 
each country to administer different policy instruments meant to address those problems. 
It is harder to detect patterns of change over time for country-specific institutions. In 
most European countries, job security provisions were tightened in the 1968-1974 period 
of union militancy. The timing of such reforms coincided with increasing unemployment 
but, of course, other simultaneous developments in, for example, the price of oil, union 
militancy, and fiscal and monetary policy make it difficult to formulate causal 
interpretations. Tentative steps towards labour market deregulation were taken by many of 
the same countries in the 1980s but, with the notable exception of the British labour market 
reform in the 1980s, dynamic developments were not such as to alter the relative rankings 
of labour market rigidity in European countries. More recently, especially since the mid 
1990s, several countries have reduced rigidity of employment relationships, albeit mostly 
of temporary and nonstandard ones; and some, notably Denmark, have substantially 
reduced the generosity of their UI system. The character of actual and envisioned reforms 
can be interpreted in light of structural changes and policy-making constraints, as 
discussed in some detail in Section 4 below. 
2.5 Non-OECD countries 
The need for market-shaping institutions and their efficiency implications are both 
stronger in poorer countries. This makes their analysis more interesting and pressing, but 
also more difficult, because available information is less plentiful and precise in broader 
samples than that compiled and made available for industrialized countries by the OECD. 
The Heckman and Pagés (2004) study of Latin American labour laws is based on 
institutional information obtained from surveys of country officials, aggregated in an index 
aimed at summarizing in terms of wage labour costs the impact not only of social security 
and other tax/subsidy provisions, but also that of firing restrictions, on the basis of turnover 
rates in the United States. While this indicator is somewhat sparse and cannot assess 
properly EPL’s impact on employment dynamics, when computed on a consistent basis for 
both OECD and Latin American countries, it does indicate that the latter tend to be more 
regulated. A similar impression is conveyed by the purely institutional indicators compiled 
by the World Bank’s Rapid Response Unit, and by the several indicators of institutional 
interference with laissez faire documented and discussed in Botero et al. (2004) for a very 
large number of countries on the basis of surveys of businessmen and labour law experts. 
Another source of information on less-developed country labour regulation is Rama and 
Artecona (2002), which however does not attempt to document the actual but only the 
nominal legal stringency of regulation. 
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As discussed by Bertola (2005), these statistics indicate that the quantity and wage 
dimensions of labour market “rigidity” are positively correlated across both OECD and 
Latin American countries, and not only among the former. This is consistent with the 
notion that both may be motivated by underlying country-specific economic and political 
concerns with imperfect (especially from the workers’ point of view) laissez faire 
outcomes. It is also interesting from this perspective to see that most Latin American 
countries are just about as heavily regulated as such OECD countries as Germany and 
Spain, and much less regulated than Anglo-Saxon countries, perhaps reflecting the 
different levels of financial market development of such groups of countries. 
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3. Institutions and empirical outcomes 
On the basis of the discussion in Section 1, institutions that remove some aspects of 
wage, work conditions and employment determination from the sphere of individual 
consensual decisions may conceivably benefit all market participants, or may at least 
benefit all or some workers at the expense of other groups. This section brings the resulting 
perspective to bear on a brief review of empirical relationships between country-level 
institutional indicators, such as those discussed in Section 2, and labour market outcomes. 
As markets continue to react to constraints and give individual incentives to work 
around rules, it is interesting to assess the relationship between labour market institutions 
not only with unemployment, inequality, productivity, and other intended and side effects, 
but also with the incidence of informal employment relationships, self-employment, 
overtime and other market reactions to constraints 6 
3.1 Interpreting cross-country evidence 
It should be made clear at the outset that empirical analysis of the relationship 
between observed institutions and their labour-market effects is far from straightforward 
when, as argued above, institutions are at least partly chosen taking into account the 
desirability of their effects and their interactions with other institutions and structural 
features. 
In theory, for example, it is clearly the case in theory that taxes reduce labour supply 
and demand and, all else equal, higher taxes should be associated with lower employment 
(Prescott, 2004). But that is not what should be observed across countries and periods, both 
because all else is not equal in reality, and because governments do not tax labour in order 
to reduce employment. They use the revenue of taxes for a variety of different purposes, 
some of which have a positive impact on employment. The impact of taxes on labour 
demand and supply differs according to structural features, including the ease with which 
production may move across national borders in reaction to taxation. 
In this and other cases, a causal interpretation of simple correlations can be very 
misleading. For example, a negative cross-country correlation between EPL and 
employment rates is fully accounted for by low female employment-population ratios in 
Southern Europe (Nickell, 1997), while EPL is positively correlated with prime-age male 
employment rates. This may – but need not – imply that tighter EPL would decrease 
female employment in northern European countries, because that and other phenomena can 
very well be rooted in social conventions and underlying cultural differences. But while a 
causal interpretation is unwarranted, such empirical findings do have interesting theoretical 
interpretations and policy implications. At least part of the observed lower female 
employment may indeed be due to tighter EPL. As discussed in Section 1, dismissal 
restrictions reduce employers’ propensities both to hire and terminate workers, with 
ambiguous implications for overall employment; but the effect on hiring may be more 
pronounced in the case of women and other workers, who may quit and re-enter the labour 
market for personal reasons. This implies that women may well be under-represented in 
the employed pool of workers when EPL is tighter, while mature male workers (who had 
time to find their jobs and are unlikely to leave the labour force) should be 
 
6 For an introduction and recent detailed studies, see Cahuc and Koeniger (2007) and the references 
therein. 
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overrepresented. 7 And if the underlying cultural tendency to employ women differs across 
countries, this mechanism can in fact explain differences in the chosen tightness of EPL: if 
(for whatever economic or non-economic reasons) a country’s women are not inclined to 
market employment, it will be particularly important to guarantee high-wage and stable 
employment to male breadwinners. 
When both policies and outcomes can jointly respond to underlying cultural 
differences, of course, it is difficult to obtain reliable estimates of structural relationships 
between institutions and outcomes (Baker et al., 2005; Rodrik, 2005). Some ceteris 
paribus implications of union activity, taxation and other institutional features can be 
detected in cross-country samples by appropriate controlled regression specifications, 
especially when time-series variation in institutions can be exploited (thereby keeping 
fixed country-specific unobservable factors), and attention is paid to interaction effects 
(Bassanini and Duval, 2006). It is insightful to consider disaggregated evidence, to the 
extent that spurious country-specific influences can be eliminated by looking at the 
implications of institutional interferences for within-country differences in labour market 
outcomes. Institutions may alter the demographic composition of employment, to the 
extent that unemployed and out-of-labour-force status are concentrated at the beginning 
and at the end of individual working careers, as well as in the female segment of the 
potential labour force. If such effects are independent of country-specific unobservable 
characteristics, they may be estimated with some confidence on country-level panel data 
(Bertola, Blau and Kahn, 2007). 
3.2 Unemployment and wage dynamics 
Bearing in mind such qualifications, the vast literature analysing cross-country and 
dynamic patterns in the relationship between labour market institutions and outcomes does 
uncover theoretically sensible and policy-relevant patterns, in particular as regards the 
contrast between the United States (and other Anglo-Saxon countries) on the one hand, and 
European (especially continental European) countries on the other hand. The experiences 
of these two groups of OECD member countries have largely mirrored each other over the 
last few decades. If in the 1960s, and until most of the 1970s, the unemployment rate of 
typical European countries was much smaller than its American counterpart, by the late 
1980s a virtually uninterrupted trend increase brought European unemployment rates to 
exceed North American ones by a large multiple (Bertola, Blau and Kahn, 2002). The 
literature seeking explanations for this “reversal of fortune” phenomenon has focused 
primarily on such labour market institutions as union coverage and representation rights, 
EPL and unemployment insurance benefits (Nickell and Layard, 1999; Nickell, Nunziata, 
Ochel and Quintini, 2003). Even though relief from the need to work should in general 
reduce employment, until the 1970s, and even in the aftermath of the period of worker 
unrest in the late 1960s, increasingly generous pro-worker institutions coexisted in Europe 
with low unemployment rates; much lower, in fact, than in the comparatively unregulated 
United States. The first oil shock and the following decades of slower growth saw the 
inception and persistence of high unemployment in most European countries, and 
increasing attention to the effect of institutions on labour market performance. 
The prevalence of long-term, collectively bargained contracts can explain why 
unemployment began to increase, more or less sharply, when oil shocks and other 
macroeconomic developments in the 1970s reduced the amount of labour demanded at any 
 
7 This theoretical implication is consistent with the empirical results of Bertola, Blau and Kahn 
(2007) on cross-country panel data. The relative-employment regression on Chilean samples 
(Montenegro and Pagés, 2004), controlling for time effects, finds that increases in EPL affect 
unemployment inflows of youth and women less than those of mature men. 
 given wage. If wages are pre-set, shocks can cause employment and unemployment 
fluctuations, the size and persistence of which depends on the extent of ex post wage 
flexibility and on the character of wage bargaining. Nominal shocks are a more relevant 
source of real wage misalignments and unemployment in labour markets with more 
pervasive and longer-term collective wage contracts. Conversely, real wages react more 
promptly to productivity shocks or growth slowdowns if bargaining parties are in a better 
position to take into account their employment implications. 
By taking into account the repercussion of higher wages on aggregate unemployment, 
a centralized bargaining process should result in better employment outcomes (Calmfors 
and Driffill, 1988). At the empirical level, however, the theoretically appealing notion of 
“centralized” bargaining is difficult to measure so precisely as to obtain reliable statistical 
results. Soskice (1990) objects to the Calmfors and Driffill classification of labour market 
institutions in various countries, and finds much less support for the basic theoretical 
insight in empirical work that classifies bargaining as decentralized in the Japanese and 
Swiss labour markets, but centralized in the Dutch and German markets, and 
acknowledges the changing pattern of wage determination in the British labour market. 
From a more substantive point of view, increasing integration of goods and products 
markets (discussed below) makes it difficult even in theory to define relevant measures of 
centralization or “corporatism”; while nationwide coordination may ease adjustment to 
largely aggregate shocks (such as the oil shocks of the 1970s), recent developments may 
call for more flexible wage and employment responses across sectors. 
To the extent that reactions to country-wide shocks are quicker (and the 
unemployment consequences of such shocks less severe) when wage bargaining is more 
centralized and better coordinated across industries, the more or less “coordinated” 
character of wage negotiations can explain the different depth and persistence of 
unemployment crises in Europe. On average, unemployment in Europe fluctuated around a 
natural level that, after having risen sharply until the early 1980s, has remained essentially 
flat for some 20 years (Blanchard, 2006) and has only recently perhaps begun to decline. 
Over the 1970s and 1980s, wage growth was much slower in the United States than in such 
European countries as Germany and Italy, mirroring unemployment dynamics in a way 
reminiscent of Figure 1’s simple employment-wage tradeoff along a downward-sloping 
labour demand schedule. Across countries, however, there is only a slight association 
between unionization indicators and unemployment levels. A much stronger association is 
evident between wage-setting centralization and measures of earnings dispersion across 
workers, whose empirical implications are discussed next. 
3.3 Wage inequality and labour income stability 
A variety of underlying characteristics of institutions, and not only workers, are 
empirically relevant to the extent of wage dispersion (Blau and Kahn, 1996, 1999). While 
centralized bargaining may be better able to coordinate reactions to aggregate shocks, it 
tends to result in less detailed, more homogenous wage structures across firms, sectors, 
regions, individuals. Not only centrally bargained wage schedules (with administrative 
extension at the sector, region, or even national level), but also statutory minimum wages, 
tend to compress the wage distribution. Wage compression is also a natural by-product of 
UI: as workers have small incentives to accept low-wage employment when generous 
unemployment benefits are available to them, the low end of laissez faire wage rates is 
truncated by high reservation wages. When individual wage bargaining is constrained by 
such institutional features, workers located in low-demand segments of the labour market 
may not obtain employment by accepting low-wage offers (and bidding down the wage of 
their employed counterparts). 
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 Empirically, centralized wage setting, and the wage floors implied by legal minima 
and/or benefit entitlements, tend to compress wages across heterogeneous workers and can 
lead to divergence of employment outcomes; for example, across demographic groups 
(Kahn, 2000), and across regions in Italy, Germany or Spain, where the uniformity of 
centrally bargained wages (and of other national institutions) tends to lower employment 
where labour is less productive. A detailed analysis of the influence of country-level labour 
market institutions on within-country wage dispersion is in Koeniger, Leonardi and 
Nunziata (2007). The relationship between labour market institutions and more general 
measures of inequality, that also account for the incidence of non-employment and for 
capital income, is studied by Checchi and Garcia Peñalosa (2005) for industrialized 
countries, where they appear to have an intuitive inequality-reducing role; and by 
Calderòn, Chong and Valdes (2003) for a broader sample of 121 countries, including many 
developing countries, where employment and industrial relation regulation is similarly 
associated with lower inequality (while purely legal measures of regulation, such as 
adoption of ILO Conventions, are not associated with inequality). 
Interestingly, and not surprisingly, relative wage variation appears to be heavily 
constrained in the same countries where EPL is most stringent (Bertola and Rogerson, 
1996). Of course, the positive or negative effects of wage and quantity rigidities tend to 
reinforce each other; quantitative firing restrictions could hardly be binding if, in the face 
of negative labour demand shocks, wages could fall so as to make stable employment 
profitable, or to induce voluntary quits. Across countries, the combination of wage and 
quantity rigidities indeed appears to protect employed workers from labour income 
volatility, as individuals enjoy more stable wages and longer tenure lengths. 
3.4 Employment protection 
Theory does not predict a strong association between employment levels and EPL. In 
the face of fluctuations in labour demand, EPL reduces the propensity of employers to 
increase employment as well as their ability to reduce it, with small and ambiguous effects 
on employment’s average along hiring and firing cycles. Empirically, there is no 
convincing evidence of any relationship between EPL and employment or unemployment 
levels. As discussed in more detail below, correlations have to be treated with caution in 
this context, but more stringent EPL is associated with more stable aggregate employment 
paths and with longer unemployment durations within the pool of unemployed workers 
(Bertola, 1999). There is instead evidence that EPL reduces the responsiveness of 
employment to labour demand and wage shocks, increases the length of unemployment 
spells, and affects the demographic composition of employment and unemployment as it 
should in theory, since it reduces job finding rates for young job market entrants and 
female workers with intermittent labour force participation at the same time as it reduces 
job-loss rates for mature workers. As it reduces both job destruction and job creation rates, 
however, EPL should not have first-order effects on overall employment. The evidence 
from regressions that control for other more relevant influences tend to confirm this (see 
Bassanini and Duval, 2006, and its references). 
To the extent that institutional factors shape wage and employment outcomes (see the 
next section for important qualifications to this evidence), “rigid” labour market 
configurations appear quite effective in sheltering workers from idiosyncratic labour-
income fluctuations. The OECD index of EPL stringency is not surprisingly strongly 
associated with average tenure lengths (Bertola, 1999). Rank-based measures are only 
qualitative, i.e. they do not assign a quantitative meaning to the difference between 
different countries’ indices. They are therefore useful in order to test predictions of theory 
that are similarly qualitative, such as that stronger job security should be associated with 
more stable employment: to this end one may, for example, relate EPL indices to the rank-
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order of the employment variances of different countries (Young, 2003, offers a detailed 
review of recent evidence in these and other aspects). 
EPL is also positively associated with wage stability indicators, across the few 
countries where time-series stability indicators are available. In heavily regulated labour 
markets, workers who are employed tend to remain employed, and their wages tend to 
remain stable over time. Stability of labour income for such workers is valuable in 
protecting their (and their families’) consumption from welfare-reducing fluctuations. In 
the absence of suitable smoothing instruments, heterogeneous welfare losses from labour 
demand instability may rationalize frequently expressed concerns with increasing wage 
inequality and labour market insecurity in the United States, the United Kingdom and other 
relatively unregulated labour markets. As in Benabou and Ok (2001), more inequality can 
be associated with higher welfare for risk-averse individuals if mobility is intense, and the 
transition probabilities to higher and lower income (and consumption) levels are non-linear 
so as to give poor individuals good “prospects of upwards mobility”. This condition is 
almost satisfied in American data, where individuals need not resent inequality very much. 
In other OECD countries, however, prospects of upward mobility for workers appear much 
more limited, and even when currently poor workers may look forward to higher future 
income, financial markets tend to prevent consumption smoothing. 
While labour reallocation across jobs is only mildly related to the stringency of EPL 
in OECD countries, flows between employment and unemployment are much smaller in 
high-EPL economies (see Blanchard and Portugal, 2001, for evidence and references). In 
the same economies that provide equal and stable incomes to employed workers, in fact, 
other institutions (like collective bargaining) tend to increase average wages and to make 
low-productivity workers difficult to employ, and to generate a large and stagnant stock of 
unemployed workers. The data do give indications of meaningful trade-offs between 
employment rates and wage equalization. Higher wage inequality is significantly 
associated with higher employment rates, after controlling for country effects (which may 
capture institutional and structural features that change only slowly over time, if at all, 
within each country) and time effects (which may offer a stylized summary measure of the 
common technological or trade-related forces that tended over the 1970-2000 period to 
increase the differentiation and turbulence of labour demand in industrialized countries). 8 
From the simple theoretical perspective outlined above, it is not surprising to see that 
wages are compressed in the same markets where EPL is most stringent. Quantitative 
firing restrictions, in fact, could hardly be binding if wage fluctuations were completely 
unrestrained: in response to the labour demand shocks that EPL are meant to protect 
workers against, wages could fall so as to make stable employment profitable, or to induce 
voluntary quits. Hence, limiting the freedom offered to employers and workers in setting 
wages gives force to quantity constraints. Moreover, to the extent that redundancy 
payments reduce workers’ mobility costs, and are larger when they are mandated by 
legislation than when they are left to imperfect private contracts, it is not surprising in light 
of workers’ mobility incentives to find that more stringent EPL is associated with smaller 
equilibrium wage differentials. To the extent that job security provisions explicitly require, 
or implicitly encourage, payments from the firing firm to departing employees, more 
stringent EPL implies that mobility costs are at least partly borne by firms, rather than by 
workers, and should be associated with smaller wage differentials in situations where 
voluntary mobility across jobs is observed. 
 
8 Bertola, Blau and Kahn (2002) and Bertola (2004b) offer a more detailed discussion of such 
phenomena, and of the role of labour market institutions in mediating the impact of structural 
shocks on wage and employment patterns. 
 Indicators of the intensity of labour reallocation across firms are only mildly related 
to EPL rigidity indicators, and this negative evidence has been the subject of extensive 
investigation (see Bertola, 1999, for a discussion and references). The data are of course 
very noisy, and this may explain the insignificant relationship between the two variables, 
but the evidence does not readily support a simple view of EPL as a rigidity factor, and 
may perhaps be taken to indicate that, in terms of the simple framework above, payments 
to redundant workers do foster financing of mobility by financially constrained workers. 
More generally, it is appropriate to try and validate aggregate indices of these and 
other labour market features by examining the extent to which their various components 
co-vary across the observation sample. The weighting of components of an overall index is 
crucial when institutional features do not co-vary strongly: for example, should regular 
employment rules be more stringent in countries where temporary employment is more 
loosely regulated, then choosing the relative weight of the two components matters directly 
for the assessment of country-level overall rigidity. Since various aspects of “rigidity” are 
uniformly more stringent or less stringent across pairs of countries, however, their 
weighting in the construction of an aggregate index will determine the quantitative 
assessment of rigidity (which also depends on functional forms in other ways), not the 
ranking of countries in that respect. 
3.5 Financial market imperfections 
In reality, workers’ consumption and their mobility investments can indeed be 
financed not only by contingent financial securities, but also by self-insurance through 
savings, and by private labour contracts with employer-financed training and/or 
redundancy pay provisions. Still, all such instruments fall short of implementing the 
smooth consumption paths and efficiency-based reallocation and retraining decisions that 
would characterize a labour market with perfect financial market access. From the 
economic point of view, wage variations are relevant to welfare only to the extent that they 
are reflected in consumption. Empirically, earnings and consumption tend to track each 
other quite closely at the individual level, especially at the low end of their distributions, 
where poor individuals find it difficult to offset labour income fluctuations by saving and 
otherwise accessing the financial market (Attanasio and Davis, 1996; Cutler and Katz, 
1991 and 1992; Blundell and Preston, 1998). 
Data and information are scarce on the financial market access of households (as 
opposed to firms). Bertola and Koeniger (2007) show that less-developed consumer credit 
(as may be determined by countries’ historically determined judicial efficiency) makes 
stable labour incomes more attractive from a welfare-theoretic point of view. To the extent 
that wage inequality and instability are determined by market institutions, rather than by 
workers’ heterogeneous productivity and the intensity of dynamic shocks, it is not 
surprising to find that it is low in countries with tight borrowing constraints. 
3.6 Training 
Pierre and Scarpetta (2007) focus on interactions between EPL and training, pointing 
out that employers may find training more appealing when firing and re-hiring is costly or 
difficult, at least if wages are also inflexible (so as to prevent workers from appropriating 
the general component of training returns: Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998). Pierre and 
Scarpetta find in cross-sectional data that firms operating in more rigid markets (as 
measured by survey perceptions or legislative assessment) do report more training activity. 
As repeatedly argued above, it is insightful to broaden the analysis to other aspects, and 
take potential market imperfections into account. 
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Across countries, tighter EPL is associated with less employer-provided training 
(Bassanini et al., 2007). The same countries where EPL is stringent also tend to feature 
poorly developed household-finance markets (Bertola and Koeniger, 2007). This is not 
surprising if scarce opportunities to smooth consumption in the face of labour income 
fluctuations make it desirable to avoid such fluctuations. Bertola (2007) shows that the 
Jappelli and Pagano (1994) index of household borrowing conditions is tightly correlated 
with the OECD index of training participation analyzed by Bassanini et al., and argues that 
this simple correlation is consistent with the standard theoretical considerations outlined in 
Section 2. If workers are liquidity constrained, then they cannot easily finance their 
(general) training, not even by accepting lower wages (and compressing their 
consumption) in exchange for employer-provided training. This establishes a direct 
channel for financial market imperfections to bear on training opportunities and outcomes. 
The empirical correlation between EPL and training can be, from this perspective, a 
spurious effect of correlation between EPL and borrowing conditions, both of which may 
help workers achieve a desirably smooth consumption path. After controlling for the 
borrowing conditions indicator, in fact, there is no relationship between EPL and training. 
Hence, there may be no need to invoke elaborate theories of why regulating dismissals 
might encourage employers to fund their employees’ training. 
Similar structural and institutional channels of interaction may be relevant to the 
empirical relationship between the correlation between the incidence of temporary 
employment and EPL (Pierre and Scarpetta, 2007, and their references), and that of 
training. Individuals with insecure jobs naturally find it difficult to access the credit market 
and, to the extent that general training must be financed by their own current consumption, 
will unsurprisingly be trained less than would be implied by efficient forward-looking 
investment decisions. 
 

 4. Dynamics and reforms 
The empirical approaches and results reviewed above treat institutions as factors 
shaping labour market outcomes, and assess their implications on the basis of ceteris 
paribus assumptions regarding economic structures and shock intensities. The idea that 
countries feature different labour market institutions, but otherwise similar economic 
structure and shocks, may be appropriate in the OECD context, where institutional 
configurations may, to a large extent, be historically determined and all countries 
experienced broadly similar fiscal/monetary policy and energy cost shocks. “Shock” 
indicators of the type considered by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) are indeed similar in 
size and character across OECD countries, to the extent that interactions between 
institutional indicators and simple time effects explain a large portion of observed 
unemployment patterns. The limited extent of dynamic variation in the institutional layout 
of labor markets makes it difficult to empirically disentangle their effects while accounting 
for country-specific characteristics. 
As discussed in Section 3, the relationship between regulatory indicators and 
outcomes of interest should be interpreted in light of other country-specific characteristics 
(which also play the role of confounding factors when assessing the impact of institutions 
on labour market outcomes). However, analysis of reform tensions resulting from the 
dynamics of structural change cannot be based very solidly on empirical analysis of actual 
reforms and other forms of institutional variation over time, as much less progress has been 
made in exploring the deeper determinants of those institutional differences. 
Institutional intervention in the labour market certainly entails costly information 
collection and performance monitoring and/or deadweight inefficiencies, at the same time 
as it may well improve the efficiency of market allocations in an imperfect world. As 
repeatedly mentioned, not only markets, but also collective policies, find it difficult to 
implement appropriate state-contingent transfers both to improve workers’ welfare and 
increase aggregate production (and profits). The relative merits of different policies vis-à-
vis markets depend on structural features. A society that can process information more 
efficiently at the aggregate level than in market interactions would be predicted to feature 
more pervasive policy interventions of the active type, based on tax-and-subsidy packages 
and/or direct management of labour reallocation costs. Societies with limited 
administration capabilities might tend to privilege simpler regulatory policies instead and, 
as in the case of EPL, task employers (presumably better-informed and better-insured than 
their employees) with avoiding or financing labour reallocation. 
In general, one would expect to see more limited policy interference in economies 
where it causes small beneficial effects and large deadweight losses; for example, because 
a very elastic structure of economic interactions gives ample scope for individuals to 
escape regulation and taxation. Importantly, however, the welfare effects of policy are not 
the same for workers who cannot shelter their consumption from income fluctuations, and 
for individuals who can access perfect financial markets instead. Workers, like the whole 
economy, benefit from allocation of more labour to high-productivity jobs. Mobility per 
se, however, does not improve workers’ welfare, which is only a function of the overall 
level and stability of wages. An efficient allocation of labour increases profits, but does not 
benefit uninsured workers when it is achieved by making wages more flexible (and 
consumption more volatile). Hence, workers and other agents differ in their appreciation of 
any given policy's impact on productive efficiency. 
In broader samples, including less developed countries, it is even more important to 
take into account that different countries face different problems, and may therefore choose 
different institutions. This makes relationships between institutions and outcomes hard to 
interpret, for the reasons explained in Rodrik (2005): in the context of the present paper’s 
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 subject matter, for example, an institutional feature may be empirically associated with 
high unemployment, not because it tends to increase unemployment, but because it tends to 
reduce it; is therefore more widely adopted in countries where unemployment is a more 
serious problem; and is not as effective as to bring unemployment back to the levels of 
luckier countries. To account for such possible interactions between policies, outcomes and 
underlying structural features in different countries and periods, it is important to try and 
consider relevant information about the economic and social structure of countries. Such 
information is unfortunately far from adequate to that purpose in practice, both because the 
potentially relevant cross-country differences are much more numerous than countries, and 
also because many obviously relevant characteristics are not observable, or are not 
measured in comparable ways. Heckman and Pagés (2004) provide interesting analyses of 
individual Latin American countries and comparisons of samples of Latin American and 
OECD countries. They make it clear that comparisons across diverse countries are useful, 
but difficult, and not easily conducive to sharp insights. When the structure of the 
problems facing the countries (and markets and individuals within countries) is very 
heterogeneous in the sample considered, in fact, it is necessary in principle and hard in 
practice to disentangle the implications of structural characteristics from those of 
institutions and policies. 
But the perspective resulting from efforts in that direction can still offer interesting, if 
relatively informal, and particularly useful insights. As both the redistributive political 
appeal and the efficiency costs of labour market regulation are enhanced by Latin 
America’s inequality and instability, much more dramatic reforms may occur there than in 
OECD countries. From this perspective, Latin American countries offer a rich set of 
reform experiences: several have pioneered the use of notional benefit accounts, which 
may indeed target the financial market failures emphasized above as possible rationales for 
observed collective interference with labour market outcomes. If the rate of return on 
notional benefit accounts suitably reflects that of investment opportunities that are 
available at the aggregate economy’s level, but not to individual workers, they can for 
example ease liquidity-constraint problems, at least if withdrawals are allowed in the 
relevant contingencies. The dramatic variability of macroeconomic and institutional 
dynamics in most Latin American countries offers welcome empirical opportunities to gain 
further insights into theoretical mechanisms. But the equally dramatic heterogeneity of 
personal circumstances in less developed countries makes it important to take into account 
the intended benefits of institutional interference with the workings of labour markets 
when discussing their actual shortcomings. 
4.1 Structural change 
Institutions that originally served a useful purpose in an imperfect world should be 
reformed when the world changes (Bertola, 2004b). Structural change can magnify the 
unemployment and employment effects of institutions meant to redistribute income and 
remedy financial market imperfection, or can make them redundant (for example, because 
financial market development makes labour income fluctuations less problematic). 
Available institutional indicators may or may not be as directly relevant to theoretical 
interactions as might be desirable, and their quality is particularly dubious along the time 
dimension that would be relevant to assess their impact in each (heterogeneous) country, 
and to study reform processes. A variety of alternative, not fully comparable data sources 
are of course available. For example, Bertola and Boeri (2002) use the FRDB database of 
reforms to assess the intensity and direction of reforms in more recent times. The resulting 
picture is one where reforms implemented are many, but typically marginal, often 
conflicting in character. Changes of institutions are hard to interpret, and their impact is 
hard to measure, since they are meant to shape forward-looking decisions along possibly 
generation-length spans of time. Much relevant, and also hard-to-interpret, information is 
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contained in policy discussions before reforms are (or are not) implemented. It would be 
interesting to try and analyse reform pressures on labour market institutions on the basis of 
indicators of expectations (or discussions) of institutional changes, since expectations of 
reforms should play an important role in any dynamic environment. 
A broad message of the data, however, is that while institutions vary widely across 
countries, they are much more stable than unemployment, wage inequality and other 
labour market outcome variables. As discussed above, unchanging institutions can shape 
an economy’s reaction to aggregate shocks. More generally, the same dynamic 
developments can produce very different employment and wage outcomes in countries 
with different (albeit stable) institutions. This can explain why, in the 1970s and 1980s, 
countries with more extensively regulated labour markets experienced more pronounced 
unemployment increases in the aftermath of similar productivity, inflation and wage 
shocks (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). Empirically, in fact, the forces that interact with 
labour market institutions in driving dynamic trajectories can be almost equally well 
represented by period-specific dummy variables rather than by observable macroeconomic 
variables, which tend to behave rather similarly over time across industrialized countries. 
The evidence can be consistent with a role for common structural change trends rather 
than for country-specific shocks. The relationship between country-specific labour market 
institutions and unemployment and wage dispersion dynamics, for example, can be 
interpreted in the light of skill-biased technological progress trends, or of increasing 
opportunities for advanced countries to import unskilled-labour-intensive goods and export 
skill-intensive ones. Over the last three decades of the twentieth century, unemployment 
displayed a trend increase in continental European countries, but remained trendless in the 
United States and other Anglo-Saxon countries, while earnings inequality remained stable 
(or even declined) in the former group of countries, but trended upward in the latter 
(Förster and Pearson, 2002; Bertola, 2004c). 9 If technological progress or international 
trade increase laissez faire wage inequality (Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993), they also 
increase the relevance of wage floors: if low wages cannot decline in European countries, 
employment of unskilled workers must decline (Krugman, 1994). Similar insights into the 
changing implications of unchanging institutions can be drawn considering other structural 
aspects. More intense product market competition, as implied by Europe’s economic 
integration process and by more general globalization trends, increases the elasticity of 
labour demand. In the context of the motivating example discussed in Section 1, a flatter 
labour demand function implies larger employment losses from any given tax or wage 
floor. 
In more complex dynamic models, if reallocation towards higher-paying jobs is 
costly, then institutions that tend to prevent wage inequality and restrict mobility have 
sharper implications for employment and unemployment when more volatile shocks affect 
labour demand (Bertola and Ichino, 1995; Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1998). In the presence 
of ongoing labour demand shocks over the lifecycle of individual jobs and of financial 
market imperfections, labour market rigidities can have the beneficial effects that 
originally motivated their introduction. However, they also tend to prevent accommodation 
of one-time adjustment pressure. The increasing relevance of flexibility concerns may 
explain why policy frameworks introduced in the 1990s, such as those recommended by 
the OECD Jobs Study and by the European Union’s Lisbon Strategy, de-emphasize income 
support for job seekers and job losers in favour of job creation spurred by wage and 
employment flexibility, and the role of training and other active labour market policies 
aimed at bringing workers’ productivity in line with wage aspirations. A labour market 
 
9 Where data allow measurement of earnings instability, unemployment appears to grow along with 
wage dispersion. See, for example, Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994). 
 where employment relationships and wage-setting are both heavily regulated may or may 
not feature lower inter-firm labour mobility (Bertola and Rogerson, 1996), and may or may 
not generate long-term unemployment, depending on the level and responsiveness of 
aggregate wages. Regulation certainly reduces productive efficiency and returns to capital 
when it removes incentives to relocate labour. These effects are particularly relevant when 
economic integration calls from one-time adjustment at the same time as, by removing 
obstacles to trade and factor mobility, it makes it more important for each country to 
achieve high productivity, and “competitiveness”. 
Flexibility-oriented reforms are at least partly motivated by such considerations, as 
well as by better empirical understanding of the effects of labour market institutions. While 
it is, in principle, obvious that institutional interference can be responsible for high 
unemployment and low employment, just because such effects depend on potentially 
heterogeneous structural parameters, it is hard to assess their impact in data where many 
relevant confounding factors cannot be controlled. As the time dimension of available data 
increases, however, it will be increasingly important when interpreting time-series 
evidence to focus on the economics and politics of reform processes rather than of 
institutions at each point in time (Saint Paul, 2000), and to be aware of plausible 
determinants of institutions. Shocks or structural change, by making job loss more or less 
likely or painful, may motivate changes in the generosity of unemployment insurance or in 
the stringency of EPL: the correlation between such institutions and employment 
performances will be largely spurious, for the reasons outlined by, for example, Rodrik 
(2005). The wide and changing variety of labour market policies across countries offers 
opportunities to try and disentangle their effects in increasingly available disaggregated 
data, at the same time as it makes it necessary to take into account the many important and 
related respects, besides labour market structure, in which countries differ. 
4.2 The international dimension 
As the more intense competition from across each country’s borders enhances the 
desirability of labour income protection at the same time as it increases the employment 
costs of the relevant policy instruments, policy reforms may well be motivated by different 
perceptions and different political processes in different countries. The internationalization 
of economic relationships, however, naturally tends to favour deregulation. If labour 
market regulation is meant to remedy market imperfections, it has to be agreed and 
enforced collectively at the same level where market interactions occur. There is of course 
a danger that uncoordinated implementation by independent policy-making authorities in 
integrated (and still imperfect) markets may ultimately find it impossible to implement 
beneficial rules. 
To foster efficiency, collective decisions must take all of their consequences into 
account, and generally need to be accompanied by compensatory transfer policies. These 
conditions are much more nearly fulfilled within national systems than in the context of 
international economic interactions. The nature of policy failures resulting from improper 
“systems competition” (Sinn, 2003) is similar to the mechanism underlying undesirable 
outcomes of laissez faire interactions among individual economic agents. Just like 
imperfect factor and good markets can fail to appropriately balance the objectives of 
economic agents with conflicting objectives, so political interactions between collective 
decision-makers whose objectives differ can result in undesirable policy configurations. 
Conflicts of interests between policy-making entities may lead to attempts to undo the 
effects of policies implemented at higher or lower levels. The resulting situation can easily 
be worse than laissez faire, in much the same way non-competitive markets can damage 
economic efficiency when individual economic agents are in a position to exploit their 
market power in pursuit of their own economic welfare. 
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 Even policy-makers who share an ultimately common view of what would constitute 
desirable outcomes may fail to take appropriate action. When implementing policies that 
have effects beyond their immediate constituency, each may rely on others to implement 
costly actions in pursuit of a common good, and inaction may result even when all share 
similar views on appropriate actions. Again, the nature of the relevant policy failure is 
similar to what may be observed when interactions at the individual level fail to address 
public-good aspects appropriately: just like individuals cannot be expected to 
spontaneously pay taxes in the absence of collective enforcement, so policy-makers cannot 
be expected to implement the tax, subsidy and regulation policies that would be optimal 
from the viewpoint of a large integrated area when their constituency is smaller than the 
scope of those policies. In both cases, the failure to see policy tradeoffs in their entirety can 
imply that policy implementation fails to address them appropriately (Sinn, 2003). When 
this happens, poor coordination results in outcomes that are unsatisfactory from the 
constituents’ and policy-makers’ own points of view. Just as market interactions can fail to 
support efficient outcomes when some markets fail to exist or function properly, so 
imperfect coordination of (for example) state aid to industry can fail to foster efficiency. 
The problems may be starkly illustrated in the context of child labour standards. In a 
perfect world, children should not work, for their own as well as society’s good, since their 
time is more productive if they learn through play and schooling, and grow ready to work 
better in adulthood. But is a ban on child labour, such as that in ILO (1973), the right way 
to address real-life child-labour problems? Like other prohibitions envisioned by labour 
market regulation, a ban can be motivated by human value considerations that abstract 
from economic considerations, or it may improve welfare uniformly if market interactions 
are highly imperfect: for example, Basu and Van (1998) show that if child labour reduces 
adult wages, then both an equilibrium with child labour and one without can exist, and that 
while welfare is higher for all workers in the latter, the former may be the decentralized 
equilibrium result of uncoordinated choices unless child labour is prohibited. But, and 
again similarly to other institutions, a ban on child labour is more likely to have mixed 
welfare and distributional implications. In rich countries, public opinion clearly opposes 
child labour. But the same is clearly not true in poor countries, where children’s work may 
often be a welfare-improving way out of extreme poverty or even starvation (Basu, 1999). 
The opposition of rich countries to child labour in developing countries may be motivated 
by personal tastes, or by the consequences of a supply of cheap products to complete with 
the unskilled labour in rich countries. In both cases, the behaviour of citizens of poor 
countries and of their governments imposes what economists call an externality on rich 
countries: a proper negative externality, if opposition to child labour is rooted in tastes; a 
“pecuniary” externality, if it is rooted in concerns about the implications that low-price 
supply (albeit efficient) has for income distribution. As Pallage and Zimmermann (2007) 
point out, addressing such externalities requires side payments: a simple ban on child 
labour, while appealing for rich countries, would not be acceptable to poor countries. 
In the international context, distribution and redistribution mediated by financial 
markets and policies may occur across many dimensions: not only between labour and 
other factors of production within each country, but also between workers across countries’ 
borders. Unfortunately, a supranational labour policy needs to be integrated with other 
aspects of social policy, and such policies not only reflect economic development levels, 
but are also deeply rooted in country-specific social and political traditions. Full economic 
integration requires not only sufficiently similar development levels (which may in part, 
but not completely, be the result of integration itself) and well-functioning markets but 
also, as long as markets do not function perfectly, well-designed compensatory payments, 
supported by sufficiently robust feelings of solidarity and a suitable political discussion 
arena. Within each country, redistribution towards non-employed workers (be they family 
members or subsidy recipients) is an essential component of the welfare gain for all 
workers. Very little compensation can be envisioned to address “fair wage” problems in 
interactions with less-developed countries. 
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 Across symmetric developed countries, it could suffice to coordinate policies, so as to 
ensure that “competition among systems” does not, in race-to-the-bottom fashion, defeat 
the purpose of policy interference with laissez faire market interactions. The issue is 
particularly important in the European Union, both because of the unprecedented degree of 
economic integration achieved by its member countries, and because lack of policy action 
in the labour field contrasts with extensive harmonization of other markets’ regulatory 
frameworks (Bertola et al., 2001). The status quo configuration of European welfare and 
labour market systems is challenged by increasing intensity of product market competition 
across and within member countries’ borders, by increased mobility of capital in the 
absence not only of controls but also of exchange rate risk, and by mobility of labour (at 
least at the margin, and from outside the area). All this may, on the one hand, make 
protection more desirable for workers by increasing the intensity of uninsurable labour 
market shocks; but, on the other hand, it may make it more difficult for institutions to 
provide protection, as producers need to react more efficiently to market signals, and 
systems of social protection need to compete for tax and contributions revenues (Sinn, 
2003). 
In practice, and not surprisingly, labour market institutions are quite stable within 
each member country. But they are also quite different across the EU, and subject 
differently to reform pressures from economic integration forces. Different configurations 
of similarly motivated protection systems are differently suited to withstand the pressures 
of economic integration. The decentralized wage bargaining, low minimum wages, and 
temporary unemployment insurance of the United States and other Anglo-Saxon countries 
allow their labour markets more adjustment dimensions than are possible for those of 
continental European countries, where regulation interferes directly with the wage and 
employment dimension of laissez faire outcomes via centralized wage setting and 
constraints on job creation and destruction. Past evidence indicates that such institutional 
configurations are ill-equipped to foster the kind of inter-industry mobility that would be 
necessary to exploit trade opportunities. In Germany, for example, apprenticeship-based 
training and industry-level wage bargaining have historically resulted not only in high 
productivity at the industry level, but also in peculiarly low inter-industry worker mobility. 
Integration of EU economies with the CEEC area, whose comparative advantage lies in 
very different industries, can be predicted to add inter-industry labour adjustment pressure 
arising from trade with other low-income countries. Geographic labour mobility is also 
much lower in Europe than in the United States. This is not only due to differences in 
culture and language: after all, in the 1950s and 1960s workers did move in Europe, not 
only within countries towards cities and industrial areas, but also across European borders. 
Rather, the relative immobility of Europeans reflects a lack of incentives, due to same 
institutions that underlie slow inter-industry mobility. Continental European systems of 
industrial relations and social policy tend to subsidize non-employment in declining areas, 
and fail to reward mobility with the wage differentials and easy job-finding opportunities 
that motivate Americans to migrate towards booming regions (Bertola, 2000a and 2004d). 
In the past, continental European countries have often avoided the impact on 
relatively rich labour markets (through migration or product-market competition) of 
integration with sources of cheap labour by explicit or implicit subsidies to unemployment 
in relatively poor labour markets, such as Southern Italy and East Germany. Given such 
tendencies, it is not surprising to see that employment performance is worse in the larger, 
more heterogeneous countries of continental Europe than in smaller countries (such as 
Austria, Ireland, Portugal, the Netherlands). The advantages of being small are twofold. On 
the one hand, labour market policies do not interfere with the adjustments entailed by 
coexistence of differently developed regions within a single regulatory framework. On the 
other hand, small countries may be better equipped to take advantage of reform 
opportunities. For example, the Netherlands was the first continental European country to 
implement employment-generating reforms, quite possibly because its economic 
integration with Germany was quite complete earlier than in the rest of Europe. By the 
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early 1980s, not only trade and capital mobility were completely liberalized but in the so-
called D-mark block the exchange rates was also, in effect, irrevocably fixed. This implied 
that a little wage moderation could attract much more business from across the German 
border, and yield large employment gains in a small country. The resulting more attractive 
tradeoff between labour market flexibility and worker protection could indeed make 
reform attractive, through the mechanism outlined above. In the Dutch case, availability of 
natural gas revenues made it possible to address demands for protection by generous early 
and invalidity retirement provisions; in Germany’s larger domestic market, labour demand 
remained relatively rigid, making incentives to reform of nationwide rules much weaker. 
Federal transfers, especially in the form of co-financing schemes, do help American 
states to resist the race-to-the-bottom or integration-resistance tensions arising when 
independent constituencies independently administer social policies. Across EU member 
countries, transfer payments play only a very limited role, whether for the purpose of 
sustaining useful interference with labour market interference in the presence of concerns 
other than production efficiency, or for other politico-economic purposes. “Cohesion” and 
“structural” funds were introduced at the EU level when the enlargements of the 1980s for 
the first time brought substantially lower-income countries into the European Union. 
Concerns regarding accession of much poorer CEEC countries are similar, but a larger role 
cannot be played by transfers, because the EU does not have a proper and politically 
supported federal fiscal policy. Transfers would arguably have negative implications for 
the labour markets of some countries as they currently do for some regions. 
 

 5. Concluding comments 
This paper’s selective review of theory, measurement and evidence emphasizes that 
labour market regulation may, but need not, serve a useful purpose, and that any 
assessment of policies and reforms should carefully take into account relevant structural 
features of each economy’s labour and other markets. Of course, the way in which 
institutional pros and cons bear on policy choices is unavoidably filtered by a political 
process, because incomplete and imperfect markets rule out a “representative individual” 
approach. The pros and cons of institutions and reforms very much depend on points of 
view, and interference with market mechanisms unavoidably has distributional 
implications, as the costs and benefits of the relevant policies and institutions differ not 
only across countries, but also across individuals. 
Minimum wages, for example, certainly reduce the employment opportunities of low-
productivity individuals at the same time as they increase the average and reduce the 
dispersion of wages among higher-productivity workers. Such distributional effects 
interact importantly with a variety of economic and social characteristics of the relevant 
population. Heterogeneous labour productivity may depend on exogenous characteristics, 
such as age and gender, but may very well reflect policies and individual choices regarding 
education and training. The impact on consumption and welfare of lower employment for 
low-wage workers depends on whether such workers belong to families who also gain 
from the better wages of higher-productivity workers, and on their non-employment 
opportunities. 
In general, however, market imperfections imply that aggregate efficiency 
considerations are not conveyed to all individuals by appropriate prices, and the resulting 
incentives to introduce distortions are heterogeneous across individuals with different 
productivity, different non-employment opportunities, or different mobility costs. Labour 
market institutions are pervasive and do matter, interacting with other institutional and 
structural features of real-life economies, not only for labour market outcomes but for any 
phenomenon where income distribution is relevant. Lo Prete (2008), for example, finds 
that standard indicators of labour market policies and household financial market access 
influence the relationship between aggregate consumption and income changes at the 
country level. Obviously, labour market regulation has pros and cons. The wide (albeit 
different) political support for it indicates that markets do fall short of maximizing all 
agents’ welfare in this area. To assess whether each labour market’s configuration strikes 
the right balance between the rigidity of regulation and flexibility of market forces, and 
why institutions differ across countries as widely as they do, it has and will be important 
for research to focus on how the benefits and costs of collective interventions in the labour 
market depend on structural features (such as the externality arising from the specification 
of mobility costs above); on the ease of individual financial market access (as indexed by 
the degree of utility curvature in the simple model above); and on the efficiency of policy 
administration. 
If labour market institutions are a partial substitute for inefficient financial contracts 
(Bertola and Koeniger, 2007), and more flexibility in the labour market makes limited 
access to consumption smoothing all the more painful for workers, it is not surprising to 
witness heavy resistance to labour market liberalization in industrialized countries with 
poor financial markets, and it is sensible to package together labour and financial market 
reforms, as was the case in the United Kingdom in the 1980s (Koeniger, 2004). As 
repeatedly noted here and in the literature, these and other important complementarities 
across labour market and other institutions imply that across-the-board deregulation has 
advantages over piece-meal reform if the objective is to bring the economy nearer to its 
laissez faire configuration and, for example, increase employment. But if institutions serve 
a useful purpose in at least some citizens’ view, complementarities also imply that 
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 resistance to comprehensive reform is likely stronger and more justified than resistance to 
marginal reforms. Thus reform, when necessary, may have good reasons to be slow, and to 
be undertaken on a case-by-case, unavoidably experimental basis. 
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